Statement of CECC Chairman Sherrod Brown and Cochairman Christopher Smith on the Release of the 2013 Annual Report
  • Thu, 10/10/2013 - 21:22

Contact: 202–226–3766
October 10, 2013

Washington, DC—The bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China today released its 2013 Annual Report on human rights and rule of law developments in China, which it is required to do by October 10 of each year. 

“Amid talk of a new round of economic reforms under President Xi Jinping, this year’s report serves as an important reminder that China is no closer to granting its citizens basic human rights than when China entered the World Trade Organization nearly 12 years ago,” said Senator Sherrod Brown (OH), Chairman of the Commission. “Increased trade ties have not improved working conditions or the environment, and Chinese citizens still do not enjoy the freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion to which they are entitled under international law. To the contrary, China’s new leaders continue to heavily censor the Internet, repress Tibetans and Uyghurs, and violate international trade rules by unfairly subsidizing state-owned enterprises, failing to stop the massive theft of intellectual property, and undervaluing its currency at the expense of American businesses and workers.” 

“In the strongest terms used to date, this report underscores the abuse of women and the draconian repressive policies which remain firmly in place, such as the one-child policy which has involved egregious abuses such as forced abortions and forced sterilizations” said Chris Smith (NJ), Cochairman of the Commission.  “President Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership talk about reform but their actions show that the Communist Party remains preoccupied with maintaining their rule at the expense of guaranteeing citizens’ rights.  As a result of the Chinese government’s barbaric attack on mothers and their children, there are some 40 million more males than females in China today.  With respect to Freedom of Religion, the report shows that practitioners continue to be harassed. Brave citizens such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo remain in jail.  And China continues to violate internationally recognized worker rights by not allowing workers to freely associate and form independent trade unions.”

The past year marked a major leadership change in China, with Xi Jinping taking over as President and the Chinese Communist Party’s General Secretary. As the report found, Xi and other top leaders began their tenure with rhetoric suggesting openness to reforms and limits on official power. The report noted, however, that Chinese officials soon cracked down on calls for human rights and the rule of law, labeling them the product of anti-China forces and targeting individuals associated with the grassroots New Citizens’ Movement, some of whom have called for officials to disclose their assets. Notable rights advocates Xu Zhiyong and Guo Feixiong joined the long list of political prisoners in China detained for criticizing their government and exercising their rights to free speech. 

The Commission documented changes at the margins throughout the report, including the issuance of a national anti-trafficking plan, the loosening of residency restrictions in some localities, the introduction of labor law amendments intended to curb the abuse of subcontracted labor, and the discontinuation of reeducation through labor sentences in some provinces. But as concerns about food safety, air pollution, corruption, and ethnic minority tensions grew this past year, the Chinese government continued to view citizen efforts to respond to these problems with suspicion and to prefer secrecy over openness.

The report recommended that Members of Congress and the Administration urge China to commit to a specific timetable to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to raise this issue at the UN Human Rights Council’s  Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record on October 22, 2013. The report also urged U.S. officials to raise China’s qualifications for membership on the UN Human Rights Council during elections in November 2013.

In addition, the report pointed out the direct connections between China’s domestic human rights and rule of law development and the public health and economic well-being of Americans, and recommended that U.S. officials include human rights and rule of law concerns as part of trade discussions with China and continue to ensure that China adheres to its World Trade Organization obligations.

The report unequivocally urges the Chinese government to stop coercion and violence against women during population planning implementation and to clarify provisions under Chinese law that would protect women against such rights abuses and establish criminal and financial penalties for officials and individuals who engage in coercive or violent population planning enforcement, including forced abortion, forced sterilization, and forced contraceptive use.

The report noted ongoing and tragic self-immolations in Tibetan areas of China and some of the most severe unrest in Xinjiang since 2009 and urged Chinese officials to adopt a more inclusive, democratic approach that fully takes into account the views of Tibetans and Uyghurs and respects their culture, language, and religion.

Finally, the report noted that Chinese officials had raised the possibility of changes to the abusive reeducation through labor system, population planning policy, and household registration system. The Commission recommended that U.S. officials inquire about possible changes in these policies and urge Chinese officials to undertake serious reform that would both remedy rights violations and lead to greater social stability by ending policies that are widely opposed in China.

The CECC’s 2013 Annual Report is the Commission's 12th since it was created by Congress in 2000. The Commission consists of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and senior Administration officials appointed by the President. The current Commissioners are Senators Sherrod Brown, Max Baucus, Carl Levin, Dianne Feinstein, and Jeff Merkley; Representatives Christopher Smith, Frank Wolf, Mark Meadows, Robert Pittenger, Tim Walz, Marcy Kaptur, and Michael Honda; and Deputy Secretary of Labor Seth Harris, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Francisco Sánchez, and USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia Nisha Desai Biswal. In addition to its annual reports, the Commission maintains an extensive database of political prisoners in China, many of whom are cited in its reports. 

All of the Commission's reporting and its Political Prisoner Database are available at

2013 Annual Report (PDF)





OCTOBER 10,  2013
Printed for  the   use  of the   Congressional-Executive  Commission on  China



SHERROD BROWN, Ohio,  Chairman
CARL  LEVIN, Michigan


FRANK WOLF,  Virginia
MARK  MEADOWS, North Carolina
TIMOTHY J. WALZ,  Minnesota
MICHAEL M.  HONDA, California

SETH D.  HARRIS, Department  of Labor
FRANCISCO J. SA´ NCHEZ, Department  of Commerce
NISHA DESAI  BISWAL,  U.S.  Agency  for  International Development

LAWRENCE  T.  LIU,  Staff  Director
PAUL  B.  PROTIC, Deputy Staff Director


Page 163

IV. Xinjiang

Human  rights  conditions in  the   Xinjiang Uyghur  Autonomous Region   (XUAR)  remained poor during the   Commission’s 2013  re- porting year. Central and  regional Chinese Communist Party and government authorities  carried out  campaigns  focused on  security and  stability to  enforce harsh  security controls and  limit the  free- doms  of movement and   expression throughout the  XUAR.  Deadly clashes that took  place  in  the  spring and  summer raised concerns about the failure of ethnic policy  in  the  XUAR  to  address the  root causes of regional instability. Overseas media and  rights groups re- ported instances during which   security forces  shot   into crowds   of Uyghurs, resulting in  deaths and  injuries. In  some  cases, Uyghur residents of the XUAR reportedly committed deadly attacks on members of security forces,  community workers, and others. Perva- sive  house searches throughout the  region, as  well  as  surveillance of individual religious believers, reportedly targeted peaceful ex- pressions of religious belief among the  Uyghur population, height- ening  tensions  in   the   region.  Intensified  regional development projects raised concerns over  disproportionate  economic, social,  and cultural opportunities for  Uyghurs and   other ethnic minorities in the  region, as  well  as  concerns over  the  effect  such   projects have had  on the  cultures and  languages of these groups.

Security Measures and  Conflict

XUAR officials  strengthened security measures in a bid  to ‘‘main- tain  stability’’ and   ‘‘fight  terrorism’’ in  the   region, using methods some  observers criticized as  repressive and counterproductive.1  In November 2012,  on  the  sidelines of the  18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in  Beijing, XUAR government chair- person Nur Bekri warned of the  ‘‘three  evil  forces’’ (terrorism, sepa- ratism, and   religious extremism)  in  the   region, saying  the   fight against separatism in  the  region would  be  ‘‘long-term, complicated and   fierce.’’ 2  According to  official   statistics  released in  January 2013,  regional authorities  allocated 9.34  billion yuan  (US$1.5 bil- lion)  to  the   public  security sector in  2012,   a  23-percent increase over  2011.3 Instances of violence throughout  the  spring and  summer report- edly  resulted in  numerous deaths, both  Han Chinese and  Uyghur, with reported death tolls   ranging from  dozens to  100  or  possibly more.  An  April  23,  2013,  clash between local  residents, community workers, and  police  in  Siriqbuya (Selibuya) township, Maralbeshi (Bachu)  county,  Kashgar  prefecture, reportedly  resulted  in   the deaths of  21  people.4  Official   media accounts of  the  incident  de- scribed it as  a terrorist attack during which  the  attackers  killed 15 community workers and  police. Some  reports from  overseas media and    human  rights  groups  questioned authorities’  portrayal  of events as  terrorist in  nature.6 A Uyghur rights advocate reportedly asserted that  a  search of  residents’  homes had   sparked the   vio- lence.7  Similar  searches are   routinely conducted throughout the XUAR  to  ‘‘maintain stability.’’   On  August 12, 2013,  the  Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate People’s  Court sentenced two  Uyghur men to  death and  three others to  terms ranging from  nine years to  life for taking part in the  violence.9

Xinhua reported that  on  June 26,  2013,   in  Lukchun  (Lukeqin) township, Pichan (Shanshan) county, Turpan prefecture, ‘‘knife- wielding rioters’’  attacked police stations and  other government buildings before  police  fired  on  them.10  Official  media reported on June 28  that 35  people  had  died,  including 24  killed by  assailants and  11  shot  and  killed by  police, and  21  people   had  been  injured in  the   incident.11   Regional officials   reported that  on  August  15, attackers  killed Turpan  Islamic Association Vice  Chairman Abdurehim Damolla in front of his  home.12  According to Radio  Free Asia  (RFA),  attackers  targeted  Damolla for supporting a  govern- ment crackdown in the  wake of the  June 26 violence.13 Some  overseas media reports and  human rights advocates ques- tioned the  official  narrative regarding the  incident on  June 26  in Turpan prefecture, including the  death toll 14  and  details of what took   place,15   and   raised  concerns about  the   role   that  repressive policies  had   played  in  contributing  to  deadly clashes  in  the   re- gion.16  Media reports and   human rights advocates cited   religious repression,17   house searches,18   and   housing redevelopment  poli- cies19  among the  factors exacerbating regional tension. House  searches  were   reportedly  also   related  to   two   separate deadly incidents in  May and   June. On  May  9,  a  Uyghur farmer, whom  authorities  believed had  been  involved in  an earlier deadly clash, reportedly stabbed  two  village  officials   to  death in  Uchar (Wuqia) township, Yengisar (Yingjisha) county, Kashgar prefecture, while  they were  conducting house searches, and  authorities subse- quently beat the  farmer to death.20 On  June 30, authorities report- edly  shot  and  killed a Uyghur man in  Artush (Atushi) city,  Qizilsu Kyrgyz  (Kezilesu Kirghiz) Autonomous Prefecture,  after  he  fatally stabbed  a  police   officer   and   injured two   others  during  a  house search.21   Additionally, on  June 28,  security forces  reportedly shot and  killed a  Uyghur man in  Uchturpan  (Wushi) county, Aksu  pre- fecture, after he  stabbed and  injured two  people, including at least one  police  officer,  when they pressed him  to shave off his  beard.22 On  June 28,  2013,   President Xi  Jinping  reportedly convened a meeting of the  Standing Committee of the  Political Bureau of the Communist  Party  Central  Committee (Politburo) to  discuss the clashes in  the  XUAR,  and   two  Politburo members, Meng  Jianzhu and  Yu Zhengsheng, subsequently traveled to the  region.23  In  June and  July, in  the  lead-up to  the  anniversary of demonstrations and riots that took  place  on July 5, 2009,  in Urumqi city,24  officials  car- ried  out  displays of military and  paramilitary force  in  Urumqi and other areas of the   XUAR, and   instituted  24-hour security patrols in   some   locations.25    Some   human  rights advocates and    inter- national observers expressed concern about the  security buildup, together with what they viewed   as  authorities’ failure to  address the  root  causes of violence.26 In  June and  August, several incidents reportedly occurred involv- ing  security forces’  deadly use  of force  against crowds  of Uyghurs. According  to  official  media, on  June 28,  security forces   detained people  involved in a ‘‘group disturbance’’ in Hanerik (Hanairike) township, Hotan  county.27   Overseas media and   rights  groups re- ported that security forces  fired  on a crowd  of Uyghurs in  Hanerik, resulting in  a  number of deaths and  injuries, with reported death tolls   ranging from  up  to  15  people   to  more   than  100.28  RFA  reported that on August 8, a clash between police  and  local  residents in  Aykol  township, Aksu  city,  Aksu   prefecture, over  religious re- strictions led  to the  deaths of at least three Uyghurs when security forces  fired  on  a  crowd  of protestors.29  [See  Freedom of Religion in this section for  more  information on  the  clash in  Aksu.]   Overseas media reported that  on August 20  in  Yilikqi   township, Kargilik (Yecheng) county,  Kashgar  prefecture,  Chinese police   shot   and killed 22  Uyghurs they suspected of terrorism, while  the  Uyghurs were performing prayers.30  Official  media confirmed the  raid, pro- viding information about a Chinese police  officer  killed in  the  inci- dent, but  did  not  confirm or deny  the  22 Uyghur casualties.31 On  August 23,  in  Kuybagh (Kuiyibage) township, Poskam (Zepu) county,  Kashgar  prefecture, security  forces   reportedly  shot   and killed 12  Uyghurs and   injured 20  authorities said  were   engaging in building and  testing explosives at a ‘‘terrorist’’  facility.32 Official  media reported in  March that courts in  Kashgar prefec- ture and   the   Bayangol Mongol   Autonomous Prefecture  had   sen- tenced 20  Uyghurs to  prison terms ranging from  five years to  life for  their  involvement in   ‘‘terrorist’’   and   ‘‘separatist’’  activities.33 Chinese authorities stated that the  20  men  had  used the  Internet and   cell  phones to  commit ‘‘terrorist’’  and   ‘‘separatist’’ crimes, in addition  to  organizing religious activities, buying weapons, and planning  to   attack  police   officers.34    Some   overseas media and human rights groups criticized the  sentences given  to  the  20  men, questioning official  accusations of terrorism and  expressing doubts over  authorities’ use  of criminal charges to  prosecute Internet and cell phone use.35

Criminal Law  and  Access  to Justice

Chinese government and   official  media reports  in  2013   under- scored the  XUAR  criminal justice system’s frequent use  of charges of ‘‘endangering state  security’’  (ESS).36 An article published by the Dui   Hua  Foundation, a  human  rights  advocacy organization, in March 2013  stressed that,  while   ESS   trials had   declined in  the XUAR,  the  number of these trials in the  XUAR  continued to  rep- resent a  highly disproportionate ratio of the  total number of ESS trials  throughout  China.37   According to  Dui  Hua estimates, based on  official  statistics, the  XUAR  accounted for  half  of first-instance ESS  trials throughout China between 2008  and 2010,  although less than 2 percent of China’s population lives  in  the  XUAR.38   Accord- ing  to  the  second annual  work  report of the  XUAR  High  People’s Court, issued in  January 2013,  314  criminal trials  involving ESS crimes were  conducted in  2012,  a 24 percent decline from  2011 fig- ures.39 Authorities reportedly detained 12 students in early May  2013  at Tarim University, located in Ala’er  city,  Aksu  prefecture.40 On  May 27,   authorities   reportedly  released  all   12   students.41    Ablimit, Dilshat,  Alimjan, Ekber, and   Abdureshit were   released on  bail.42 The  conditions of their bail,  which  will  remain in  place  until May 27, 2014,  include restrictions on their movement.43 Alimjan was  re- portedly detained again by Ala’er  public  security officials  for about a day  beginning on June 21,44 and  was  beaten during both  periods of detention.45

Development Policy

During the  2013  reporting year, XUAR officials  accelerated large- scale   development plans throughout  the   region, including  in  the areas of infrastructure,46   transportation,47  energy exploitation,48 urban  and   rural  construction,49  education,50  and   employment.51 XUAR  authorities  oversaw billions of yuan in  investment in  state- led  development  projects and   sought to  attract  private domestic and  foreign investment in the  region, touting it as an  economic hub for  central, western, and  southern Asia.52  Regional officials  reiter- ated development goals   first  announced at  the   Xinjiang  Work Forum in  2010 53  and  reiterated strategies for  economic and  polit- ical  development that  prioritize state  economic and  political goals over   respecting  the   rights of  XUAR  residents,54    including those outlined in   the   PRC   Regional Ethnic  Autonomy Law.55   Inter- national observers have expressed concerns over  the  expropriation and  destruction of ethnic minority residents’ property and  a lack  of protections for  cultural heritage related to  urban development ini- tiatives in the region.56 In 2013,  regional officials  oversaw the  growth of ‘‘counterpart support’’  programs that bring funding and  personnel assistance to the   XUAR  for  development initiatives  from   provinces and   cities outside of the  region,57  stressing the  patriotic nature of promoting regional economic development.58  Counterpart  provinces and  cities reportedly  provided 149.3  billion yuan  (US$24.3 billion)   in  aid  to the   XUAR   in   2012,   a   37.3-percent  increase  over  the   previous year.59 Increased migration to  the  XUAR  in  recent years has  reportedly heightened ethnic tensions in some   areas and   sparked  concerns among Uyghur residents regarding land rights and  employment op- portunities.60    Regional development initiatives  brought increased Han Chinese migration to the   XUAR  during the   past  year, often into    southern  areas  of   the    XUAR  traditionally   inhabited   by Uyghurs and  other ethnic minorities, and  state-led programs pro- vided  assistance to  migrants and   workers from  other provinces.61 This  past year, reports cited  Uyghurs’ concerns over  government authorities’ expropriation of their land,62 inadequate government compensation for  expropriated land then sold  at a  higher price  to Chinese buyers,63  and  government subsidies given  only  to new  Han Chinese migrants that  allowed them to  save   money   to  purchase more  land.64  The  growth of the  Xinjiang Production and  Construc- tion  Corps (XPCC) 65 in  southern areas of the  XUAR,  billed  by Chi- nese  leaders as  a conduit for regional development in the  aftermath of the  July 2009  demonstrations and  riots, has  brought thousands of Han Chinese migrants into areas near the  majority-Uyghur city of Hotan.66 During the  reporting period, authorities  intensified housing con- struction and  demolition projects in rural and  urban areas of the XUAR,  in  areas  inhabited by  Uyghurs and   other ethnic  minori- ties.67  ‘‘Counterpart support’’  projects provided hundreds of millions of  yuan for  construction and   resettlement  efforts.68  In   2013,   re- gional authorities  continued work  to  relocate and  resettle farmers and  herders away from  grasslands, as  part of programs that  XUAR authorities publicize as  improving farmers’ and  herders’ living  conditions.  These policies have impacted affected groups with liveli- hoods  based on  traditional  nomadic herding practices.70   According to  official   statistics  released in   May   2013,  authorities  resettled 136,800 herders  in  the  XUAR  between 2010  and  2012,  comprising 49.2  percent of the  total population of herders in the  XUAR.71

Demolitions in Kashgar’s Old  City

Authorities  continued  to  demolish  and   redevelop  the   Old  City section of Kashgar city,72 raising concerns over  the  corresponding loss  of unique cultural heritage 73  and  the resettlement of 220,000 Uyghur   residents.74      The    Old    City    demolitions,   along     with demolitions in other areas of the  XUAR,  have been  carried out  in line  with broader development initiatives and   a  five-year demoli- tion  project launched in 2009.75 Since  demolitions began in 2009, authorities have reportedly disregarded Uyghur residents’ concerns over  demolition efforts,76  in spite of official  pledges to  consult resi- dents for  their opinions.77  Groups promoting the protection of cul- tural  heritage have outlined concerns over  a  lack  of transparency in  the process of planning and  implementing the  demolitions, and have  expressed  concern  over  officials’   failure  to   consider alter- natives to the  wholesale demolition of Old City buildings.78


Some  government and  private employers in  the  XUAR continued to  discriminate against non-Han job  candidates. As  in  past years, some   job  announcements  reserved  positions  exclusively for  Han Chinese in  civil  servant posts and  private-sector jobs,  in  contraven- tion   of provisions  in  Chinese  law   that forbid   ethnic  discrimina- tion.79 Private and  public employers also  continued to reserve more positions for  men,  leaving non-Han women to  face  both  ethnic and gender discrimination in  the   employment process.80   A  study  con- ducted by the University of Melbourne, Australia, and  published in November 2012,   found   that  Han Chinese residents of  the   XUAR are  much more  likely  than Uyghur residents to secure employment in high-paying, high-status  occupations, a  trend that has   exacer- bated ethnic tensions in the region.81


Regional  officials   continued  to   carry  out   programs that  send young  non-Han men  and women outside of the  XUAR  for  employ- ment,  under  the   slogan  of  ‘‘transferring  the  excess   rural  labor force.’’ According to a January 2013  official  news  report, more  than 2.7  million  people   had   been   transferred to  jobs  outside  of  their home  area or outside of the  XUAR in  2012,82  an  increase from  2.58 million people  in  2011.83  As documented by the  Commission in  re- cent   years, some  participants and   their  family members have re- ported coercion to participate in  the  programs, the  use  of underage workers, and   exploitative working conditions.84   XUAR  authorities also  reportedly forced  some  Uyghur farmers to  perform road-build- ing  and  agricultural work  without pay,  although such  ‘‘free labor’’ programs officially  had  been  abolished.85

Freedom of Expression

Local  governments in  the  XUAR  continued to  implement censor- ship  campaigns focused on religious and  political publications dur- ing  the  reporting period. The  campaigns have targeted pirated and pornographic  items  in   addition  to   publications  deemed  ‘‘illegal’’ solely because of their religious or political content.86  For  instance, in  March 2013,  the  XUAR Transportation Department published a statement indicating that, in  2012,  regional transportation  officials had   uncovered  4,469   copies   of  ‘‘illegal  religious  publications,’’ as part of a campaign to ‘‘sweep away pornography.’’ 87 Uyghurs continued to  serve prison sentences as  a  result of exer- cising  their right to free speech. In  February 2013,  Uyghur Online, a  Web  site  focused on  Uyghur issues, reported that, in  April  2009, the   Kashgar  Municipality Intermediate  People’s   Court  sentenced Uyghur translator  Mirhemitjan Muzepper to 11 years in  prison for ‘‘inciting  splittism of  the   state,’’  information that  authorities had not  publicized.88  The  court had   connected Muzepper’s sentence to his  work  as  a temporary translator for a Hong Kong  media organi- zation reporting on  the  demolitions taking place  in  Kashgar’s Old City.89

Passport and  Exit  Restrictions

During the  reporting year, Chinese officials  implemented restric- tions  on   passports  and   international  and    domestic  travel   for Uyghurs, highlighting official restrictions on Uyghurs’ freedom of movement.90  In  February 2013,  Chinese authorities  reportedly de- tained Beijing-based Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, who  founded the Web  site  Uyghur Online, at the Beijing Capital International  Air- port, preventing him  from  boarding a flight to the  United States.91 Tohti reportedly held  a  valid  passport and  had  been  issued a  visa for  educational  exchange to  the   United States,  where he  planned to  take up  a  visiting scholar position at Indiana University.92  Au- thorities also  held   and   interrogated Uyghur university student Atikem Rozi in  February 2013,  after she  attempted to  apply for  a passport for the  second time in  order to study abroad.93  The  Toqsu (Xinhe)  County Foreign Affairs Office in Aksu  prefecture reportedly informed Rozi that the  passport denial was  due  to the  fact  that she was ‘‘politically  unqualified.’’ 94   In  July 2013,  Rozi  reported her  be- lief  that police  had  detained her   friend Mutellip Imin—a Uyghur studying abroad in  Turkey who  had  performed volunteer work  for Uyghur Online 95—on July 15  at the  Beijing Capital International Airport as he  prepared to  fly back  to  Turkey from  Beijing.96  As of September 23, 2013,  the  Commission had  not  observed any  news regarding Mutellip’s release from  detention. [See  Section II—Free- dom  of Residence and  Movement for additional information on free- dom  of movement in China.]

Forced  Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and  Migrants

The  deportation and  reports of the  sentencing of Uyghur asylum seekers this past year highlighted the  dangers facing  Uyghur refu- gees  and   asylum seekers in  neighboring countries that  are  under the  influence of Chinese economic and  diplomatic power. In  Decem- ber  2012, Malaysian authorities deported six  Uyghur asylum seekers   to  China, although the   UN  High   Commissioner for  Refugees was  still  reviewing their asylum claims.97 Malaysian authorities re- portedly had  detained the  six  Uyghurs earlier in 2012  for allegedly attempting  to  leave   Malaysia  on  forged   passports.98   Two  inter- national human rights groups raised questions regarding the  Chi- nese   government’s role  in  the   forced  return, one  of  several  docu- mented cases  of forced  deportation of Uyghurs to China in recent years.99 In  another case,  Radio  Free Asia  (RFA) reported in Decem- ber  2012  that, according to  a  Malaysian lawyer, 11  Uyghurs pre- viously deported from  Malaysia in  August 2011  had  been  charged with terrorism and  separatism;  according to  relatives and  friends, the  men  had  been  sentenced to  prison for  terms of up  to  15  years on charges of separatism.100

Freedom of Religion

XUAR  authorities  continued intensive controls over  religion, es- pecially Islam, posing a challenge for Uyghurs seeking to maintain their religious beliefs  outside of state control.101 Authorities contin- ued   to  enforce tight  restrictions  over   peaceful religious practices among the   Uyghur  population, and   carried out   targeted  surveil- lance   of  individual religious  believers.102    A  report  issued  by   a Uyghur human rights organization in  April 2013  outlined concerns over  religious policies implemented by central and  local  authorities, which   the  group said   ‘‘have  progressively narrowed the  definition of lawful [religious] activity’’  among Uyghurs.103  The  report also highlighted concerns over  a  lack  of transparency in  religious regu- lations,  official   limitations  on   religious  pilgrimages,  and    other issues related  to  official   restrictions  on  Uyghurs’ religious  prac- tices.104 On  August 7,  on  the  eve  of the  Eid  holiday marking the  end  of the   Muslim  holy   month of  Ramadan,  police   in   Aykol   township, Aksu   prefecture, reportedly sought to  prevent residents from  an- other  village from   engaging  in   cross-village worship,105    and   de- tained several Uyghur men  for engaging in  ‘‘illegal religious activi- ties.’’ 106 In  the  early morning hours of August 8, after hundreds of people   gathered in  protest,  throwing stones and  bricks, security forces  reportedly fired  on  the  crowd,  killing at least three Uyghurs and injuring at least a dozen.107  Around 10 to 12 police  officers  re- portedly also  sustained injuries in  the   clash.108  Police   reportedly arrested more  than 90 people  after the incident.109  Central govern- ment  propaganda  authorities  reportedly  forbade  Chinese  media from  reporting on the  confrontation, which  officials  described as  ‘‘ri- oting  and  looting.’’ 110 Together  with  widespread  security  checks,  police   raids,  and house searches among the Uyghur population aimed partially at cracking down  on  ‘‘illegal religious  activities,’’ 111 authorities in  the XUAR  reportedly subjected Uyghurs practicing traditional  Islamic customs to close  scrutiny. Authorities in  Bulaqsu township, Shufu county, Kashgar  prefecture,  reportedly kept  registers  related  to ‘‘stability maintenance’’ efforts that  detailed the  personal informa- tion  of local  religious believers and   their  family members.112   The registers included information such  as  whether or not  female Mus- lims  wore  a veil  and  when they started wearing it,  as  well  as  what time  a  student of  the   Quran  received Quranic instruction.113  

A Uyghur resident of Keriya (Yutian) county, Hotan prefecture, told RFA  in  May  2013  that local officials   in  his  township maintained registration books  documenting religious believers,114  and   a  resident of Urumqi city  reportedly told  RFA  that officials  maintained such documents throughout the  XUAR.115 Regional authorities  carried  out   training  sessions for  religious clergy  throughout the XUAR, placing an  emphasis on reinforcing patriotism and  opposing ‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ 116 At  a  train- ing   session  for  ‘‘patriotic religious  figures’’  in  Urumqi in  March 2013,   XUAR  government chairperson  Nur  Bekri expressed hopes that  attendees would   become  ‘‘politically   reliable’’   ‘‘patriotic reli- gious  figures’’  who  would  ‘‘guide religion to adapt to  socialist  soci- ety.’’ 117  Chinese government- and  Communist Party-led ideological campaigns encouraging students and  youth in  the  XUAR to refrain from  engaging in  ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ were  frequent and widespread throughout this reporting period.118 Local  governments in  2013  also  continued to  train  women reli- gious   specialists,  known as bu¨ wi,119   using legal   restrictions that place   them  under  strict  state  control.120 According to  an   official media report, in  December 2012,  the  Kashgar Women’s  Federation sent 19  bu¨ wi  and  other female religious figures to  trainings in  six eastern Chinese cities, stressing that the  women should, upon  their return, transmit the  Party’s policies on  ethnic minorities and  reli- gion,  and  propagate ethnic unity.121 Authorities  in   Kashgar  city    reportedly   detained   23-year-old Uyghur Nurmemet Ismail without charge for 63 days  beginning on March 1,  2013,   for  selling the   Quran and   Quranic study aids.122 Authorities’ exact  reasons for detaining Ismail are  unclear,123 but regional religious regulations stipulate that government approval is required for  the   sale   and   distribution of religious material, and these regulations may  have been  a  factor in  Ismail’s detention.124 Some  Uyghur Muslims and  Christians continued to  serve prison sentences as  a  result of exercising their  faith.125   According  to  a January  2013   RFA   report,  authorities  reduced family visits  to jailed Uyghur  pastor  Alimjan Yimit   from   once  a  month to  once every three months.126 As in 2012,127 local government officials  throughout the  XUAR reportedly maintained restrictions over  Uyghurs’ observance of Ramadan, prohibiting minors from  entering mosques,128 and  for- bidding  government  officials, students,   and   teachers  from   fast- ing.129   According to Uyghur Online, in  July 2013,  county officials fired  Abduhelil Ablimit, a staff  member at a county government of- fice  in  Shule county, Kashgar prefecture, for  fasting.130  Local  offi- cials   also   placed restrictions  on cross-village worship during  the Ramadan period.131  [See  Section II—Freedom of Religion for addi- tional information on religion in  China, including cases  of religious repression in the XUAR.]

Language Policy  and  ‘‘Bilingual Education’’

In  the  past year, the  XUAR  government broadened the  scope  of Mandarin-focused ‘‘bilingual education’’ in the  region, a policy  some Uyghur students in  the  XUAR  fear  is  aimed at assimilating young Uyghurs into  Chinese society at the  expense of their Uyghur iden- tity.132 The  expansion of the  policy  was  carried out  in line  with tar- 171

gets  set  in  2010  to  universalize and   develop ‘‘bilingual   education’’ in  preschool through  secondary school  instruction throughout the region.133  Under ‘‘bilingual  education,’’ class instruction takes place primarily in  Mandarin Chinese, largely replacing instruction in languages spoken by  ethnic minority groups.134   In  recent  years, some  Uyghur students and   teachers have expressed concern over the   compulsory nature  of  the   region’s   ‘‘bilingual’’  curriculum and the   corresponding  loss   of  young   Uyghurs’  ability  to   speak the Uyghur language.135 The  number of students enrolled in  ‘‘bilingual  education’’ has  in- creased rapidly in  the past several years. According to the  People’s Daily,   at the   end  of 2012,  1.41  million students  were   enrolled in ‘‘bilingual   education’’  from   the   preschool through  the   secondary school  level  in  the XUAR,  making up  55  percent of the  XUAR  eth- nic  minority student population.136  This represents a  41.6-percent increase in  the  ‘‘bilingual’’ student population over  2009.137 Accord- ing  to China News  Service, from  2008  to 2012,  central and  regional authorities invested 5  billion yuan  (US$816 million) on  preschool ‘‘bilingual    education’’ initiatives,   establishing   2,237    ‘‘bilingual’’ nursery schools  throughout the  region.138

Population  Planning  Policies

Government authorities  throughout the   XUAR  promoted family planning campaigns targeting  Muslim ethnic minorities, and  com- pelling Islamic religious figures to  promote state  family planning policies. Authorities continued to issue monetary rewards to ethnic minority households who  have fewer  children than allowed under XUAR  population and  family planning regulations.139  The rewards are  issued according to a ‘‘special rewards system’’  for non-Han households that includes a ‘‘fewer births, faster wealth’’  (shaosheng kuaifu) program.140  The  system is  one  of the reward mechanisms present  throughout  China’s population planning  system,  though with special focus  on ethnic minority households.141 In   2013,   authorities  in   the   XUAR  and   some   other  regions of China with Muslim populations continued to  report on  the  imple- mentation  of  a   program  entitled  ‘‘Muslim  Reproductive Health Project’’  (musilin  shengzhi jiankang  xiangmu).142   Official   reports have described the  project’s aims as  providing reproductive health information and   health  checks for  Muslim women of reproductive age  while  ‘‘creating a  harmonious happy family.’’ 143 Official  media reports this past year emphasized the   need   to  improve the   effec- tiveness of project efforts, including through Islamic religious lead- ers’ promotion of the  project among local Muslims.144

Notes to  Section IV—Xinjiang

1 ‘‘China  Jails 20  in  Restive Xinjiang Region,’’  Agence  France-Presse, 27  March 13;  Edward Wong,  ‘‘Killings  Stir Fears of Ethnic Tensions in  Chinese Region,’’  New  York  Times, 8  March 13;  Human Rights Watch, ‘‘World Report 2013:  China,’’  1 February 13,  1,  3; ‘‘A  Muslim Divide in China,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  30 November 12.
2 ‘‘Xinjiang   Governor  Sees   ‘Long-Term,  Complicated,   Fierce’   Battle  Against   Separatism,’’ Xinhua, reprinted  in  Global   Times, 11  November 12;  Wu  Haochen, ‘‘Nur  Bekri: People of All Ethnic Groups in  Xinjiang Condemn Terrorist  Attacks’’  [Nuer baikeli: xinjiang gezu  minzhong qianze kongxi], Ta Kung Pao,  10 November 12.
3 Cui  Jia, ‘‘Xinjiang  Improves Social   Stability After   Attacks,’’   China Daily,   27  January  13; Ministry of Finance, ‘‘Report on Xinjiang 2012  Budget Implementation Situation and  2013   Draft Budget’’  [Xinjiang 2012  nian yuxuan zhixing qingkuang he  2013  nian yusuan caoan de  baogao], reprinted in China Central Government Net,  19 February 13.
4 Cui  Jia, ‘‘Recalling  Pain From Day  of Horror,’’  China Daily,   2  May  13;  Stephen McDonell, ‘‘21 People Killed  in Unrest in China’s Xinjiang,’’  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, including material from  Agence  France-Presse, 24 April  13.
5 Cui  Jia, ‘‘City Unites To  Say  Farewell,’’ China  Daily,   30  April  13;  ‘‘Full Justice for   the  25 Terrorists Planning To ‘Do Something Big’ in  Kashgar This  Summer’’  [Yumou  jinxia zai  kashi
‘‘gan dashi’’  25  ge kongbu fenzi  quan gui  an],  Chengdu Evening News, reprinted in  Guangming Daily,  30 April  13.
6 Damian Grammaticas, ‘‘Doubts  Over  China Government Claims on  Xinjiang Attack,’’  BBC, 26  April  13; Peter Ford, ‘‘Mystery  Clouds Deadly Clash in  Western China With  ‘Suspected Ter- rorists,’ ’’    Christian  Science Monitor, 24  April   13;  Uyghur  American  Association,   ‘‘Unlawful House Search  and   Arbitrary  Use   of  Lethal  Force   Results  in  Nearly  Two  Dozen   Deaths in Kashgar,’’ 24  April  13;  World  Uyghur Congress, ‘‘Call Issued for  Independent   Investigation on Maralbeshi Incident by World  Uyghur Congress and  International  Community Urged to  Follow Up on Recent Arrests,’’ 1 May  13.
7 Uyghur American Association, ‘‘Unlawful  House Search and   Arbitrary Use  of Lethal  Force Results in Nearly Two Dozen  Deaths in Kashgar,’’ 24 April  13.
8 See,  e.g.,  ‘‘Inspection in  Awat   County Leads to  Two  Dead—Authorities Conceal Details  of Case’’ [Xinjiang awati xian  qingcha zhi  er  ren  siwang dangju yinman anqing], Uyghur Online, 23  May  13;  Meng  Hongqi, Qiongkule Township Government,  ‘‘Qiongkule  Township Focuses on Carrying  Out   the   ‘Two  Sessions’  Security  Inspection  Operation’’ [Qiongkule  xiang  jizhong kaizhan ‘‘lianghui’’ anbao da  qingcha xingdong], 6 March 13;  Xiang  Xuan, ‘‘Halayugong Town- ship  Carries Out  Major   Stability  Maintenance Inspection’’ [Halayugong xiang kaizhan  weiwen da   qingcha], Xinjiang Peace Net,  13 June 13.
9 ‘‘5  Jailed, Sentenced to  Death for  Xinjiang Terrorist  Attack,’’  Xinhua, 12  August 13;  Tian Shan, ‘‘First  Instance Verdict Announced Today  in  Xinjiang Bachu Violent Terrorist Case:  5 Ac- cused  and  2 Receive  Death Penalty’’  [Xinjiang bachu baokong an  jin  yi  shen xuanpan: 5 ming beigao  2 ren  huo  sixing], Tianshan Net,  reprinted in Beijing Daily,  12 August 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘5 Uyghurs Sentenced in  China for Attack,’’  New  York  Times, 12 August 13.  The  five men  were sentenced on  charges  including intentional  homicide and   organizing  and   leading  a   terrorist group.
10 ‘‘Last Fugitive of Xinjiang Attack Captured,’’ Xinhua, reprinted  in  CRIEnglish, 30  June  13. 11 Lin  Meilian and   Yang  Jingjie, ‘‘Riot Toll  Rises   to  35  in  Xinjiang,’’  Global  Times, 28  June 13.
12 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region  Public Security Bureau, ‘‘Reward  Notice’’ [Xuanshang tonggao], reprinted  in  Tianshan Net,   16  August 13;  ‘‘ ‘8–15’ Religious Personnel Murder Case Cracked’’  [8–15  zongjiao renshi  bei  hai  an  gaopo],  Turpan Net,  19  August 13;  ‘‘Imam   Stabbed to Death After  Supporting Crackdown Against Uyghurs,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  16 August 13.
13 ‘‘Imam  Stabbed to  Death After  Supporting  Crackdown Against Uyghurs,’’ Radio  Free Asia, 16  August 13;  ‘‘Vice Chair of  Turpan  Islamic Association Hacked to  Death’’  [Tulufan yisilan xiehui fu zhuxi zao kan si], Radio  Free Asia,  16 August 13.
14 ‘‘Xinjiang Violence  More  Serious Than Reported,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  27 June 13; ‘‘Chinese   Au- thorities  Confirm Police   Fired at  Uyghur Protesters,’’ Radio   Free  Asia,   30  June 13;   World Uyghur Congress, ‘‘WUC Issues Report on  the  Recent Incidents in  East Turkestan,’’ 5 July 13.
15 ‘‘Xinjiang   Violence   More   Serious  Than  Reported,’’   Radio   Free  Asia,   27   June  13;  ‘‘Two Uyghurs  Believed Killed   in  Hotan Violence,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  28  June 13;  Uyghur American Association, ‘‘The Uyghur American Association Expresses Concern at Massive Build Up  of Chi- nese  Security Forces in  East Turkestan,’’ 1 July 13; Uyghur American Association, ‘‘The Uyghur American Association Calls on the  Chinese Government To Substantiate Terror Claims With  an Open   and   Independent  Investigation,’’ 28  June  13;  Uyghur  American  Association,  ‘‘Uyghur American Association Urges Caution on Details of June 26,  2013  Turpan Incident,’’ 26 June 13; World  Uyghur Congress, ‘‘WUC Issues Report on  the   Recent Incidents in  East  Turkestan,’’ 5 July 13.
16 Uyghur American Association, ‘‘The  Uyghur  American Association Calls  on  the   Chinese Government To Substantiate  Terror Claims With  an  Open  and  Independent  Investigation,’’ 28 June 13; Gillian Wong,  ‘‘Scholar  Slams China Repression of Ethnic Minority,’’  Associated Press, 5 July 13;  Chris Buckley, ‘‘27 Die  in  Rioting in  Ethnically Divided Western China,’’  New  York Times, 26  June 13.  In  addition, U.S.  State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell stated at a press briefing on April  24, 2013,  that ‘‘  .  .  . we urge the  Chinese authorities to conduct a thor- ough  and  transparent investigation of this incident, and  to  provide all  Chinese citizens, includ- ing  Uighurs, the  due  process protections to  which  they are  entitled not   only  under  China’s con- stitutional laws  but  under their international human rights commitments as  well.’’ See  U.S.  De- partment of State, Daily  Press Briefing, 24 April  13.
17 ‘‘Unveiled   Threats,’’ Economist,  6  July 13;  Kelly   Olsen,  ‘‘Identity Crisis  Behind   China’s Xinjiang Unrest: Experts,’’ Agence  France-Presse, reprinted in Fox News, 3 July 13.

18 ‘‘Forced   Searches  in   Kashgar,  Yengisar  County  Last  Week   Lead    to   Conflict’’    [Kashi yingshaji xian  shangzhou qiangzhi qingcha yinfa  chongtu], Radio  Free Asia,  14 May  13; Uyghur American Association, ‘‘Unlawful  House Search and  Arbitrary Use  of Lethal Force  Results [in] Nearly Two Dozen  Deaths in Kashgar,’’ 24 April  13.
19 ‘‘Restive Xinjiang,’’  Wall  Street Journal, 2 July 13; Chris Buckley, ‘‘27 Die in Rioting in Eth- nically Divided Western China,’’ New  York  Times, 26 June 13.
20 ‘‘Xinjiang Clash Leaves Two Village  Officials Dead,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  24 May  13.
21 ‘‘Two Dead   in   Xinjiang  Attack  Following House  Search,’’   Radio   Free  Asia,   5  July    13; ‘‘Uyghur  Shot  in Attack,’’  Global  Times, 11 July 13.
22 ‘‘Uyghur  Man   Shot   Dead   in  Violence   Sparked by  His  Beard,’’  Radio   Free Asia,  5   August 13;  ‘‘Xinjiang  Man  Pressed To Shave Off His  Beard Is  Killed  by  Police  After  Stabbing Two   Po- lice’’ [Bei  qiangxing yaoqiu tixu  xinjiang nanzi zhashang liang jing  hou  bei  jingcha jibi],  Radio Free Asia,  4 August 13.
23 ‘‘Unveiled  Threats,’’ Economist, 6 July 13; Stephen Chen, ‘‘Top Officials in  Emergency Visit to Xinjiang After  Outbreaks of Unrest,’’ South China Morning Post, 30 June 13.
24 For   Commission analysis  on   the   July  2009   demonstrations  and   riots  in   Urumqi,   see ‘‘Xinjiang  Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow  of  Information,’’ CECC  China Human Rights and  Rule  of Law  Update, No. 4, 2009,  2.
25 Julie Makinen, ‘‘China  Sends  Armored Vehicles to  Volatile Xinjiang Region,’’  Los  Angeles Times, 29  June 13;  ‘‘Bloody Clashes Bring Army  Onto  Streets in  Xinjiang,’’  South China Morn- ing  Post, 1 July 13; ‘‘China  Tightens Security in Xinjiang Ahead of Anniversary,’’ Voice of Amer- ica,  2  July 13;  ‘‘Unveiled   Threats,’’ Economist,  6  July 13;  ‘‘Official  Urges 24-Hour Patrol in Xinjiang After  Terror Attacks,’’  Xinhua, reprinted in CRIEnglish, 30 June 13.
26 Gillian Wong,  ‘‘Scholar  Slams China Repression of  Ethnic Minority,’’   Associated  Press,  5 July 13;  Uyghur American Association, ‘‘The Uyghur American Association Expresses Concern at Massive Build Up  of Chinese Security Forces in  East Turkestan,’’ 1 July 13; ‘‘EU Says  China Needs  To  Release  More   Information  About   Xinjiang  Violence, Address  Causes,’’   Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 1 July 13.
27 ‘‘Xinjiang    Properly  Handles   Group  Disturbance   Incident,   There  Are    No    Casualties’’ [Xinjiang tuoshan  chuzhi yi  qi  qunti juji  naoshi shijian wu  qunzhong shangwang], Tianshan Net,   28  June 13.  There is  at least one  conflicting official  media report regarding the  June  28 incident or  incidents in  Hoten prefecture. The  Global  Times reported that ‘‘over 100  terrorists’’ armed with knives attacked a  police  station in  Qaraqash (Moyu)  county, Hoten prefecture. See Qiu  Yongzheng, ‘‘New Round of Riots  Brings Fresh Violence  to Xinjiang,’’  Global  Times, 29 June 13.
28 ‘‘At Least 15  Uyghurs Killed  in  Police  Shootout in  Xinjiang,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  25   August 13;  Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Over News  of Clash, a  Shroud of Silence in  Xinjiang,’’  New  York  Times, 26  August 13.  Radio  Free Asia,  citing local  officials, reported that  ‘‘up to  15  people    may  have been  killed and  50 others injured’’  in the  incident. According to the  New  York   Times, ‘‘numerous sources say  that dozens were  shot  dead on  the  highway that  connects Hanerik to  Hotan,’’  and ‘‘[e]xile groups [said]  the  death toll  may  exceed  100.’’
29 ‘‘In  Another  Bloody   Conflict  in   Xinjiang,  3  Are   Dead   and   More   Than  20  Are    Injured’’ [Xinjiang zai  you  liuxue chongtu 3  si  20  duo  shang], Radio   Free Asia,  12  August 13;  ‘‘Three Uyghurs Shot  Dead, 20 Injured in Eid  Eve  Clashes,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  10 August 13.
30 ‘‘Death  Toll  in  Xinjiang Police  Shootout Climbs As  Exile   Group Blasts Raid,’’  Radio    Free Asia,  27 August 13; ‘‘China  Confirms Raid  on Alleged  Terror Cell  in  Restive Northwest, But  De- tails Remain Sketchy,’’  Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 28 August 13.
31 ‘‘In the  Violent Terrorist Incident in  Xinjiang, Kashgar on August 20,  a Member of the  Spe- cial  Police  Sacrificed Himself ’’   [Xinjiang kashi  8  yue  20  ri  fasheng baoli   kongbu an   yi  ming tejing xisheng], Kashgar Daily,  reprinted in People’s  Daily,  28 August 13.
32 ‘‘Up to  12  Uyghurs Shot   Dead   in  Raid  on  Xinjiang ‘Munitions Center,’ ’’   Radio  Free   Asia, 17  September 13;  ‘‘Xinjiang  Terrorist  Training Camp Destroyed, 12  Uyghurs Killed’’ [Xinjiang daopo  kongxi xunlian  ying  jiao  12  weizu  ren],  Radio  Free Asia,  18  September 13;  Andrew Ja- cobs,  ‘‘12 Are  Killed  in  Raid  by  Security Forces in  Western China,’’  New  York  Times, 18  Sep- tember 13.
33 Zhang Yiwei,  ‘‘Terrorists Sentenced  By  Xinjiang Courts,’’  Global  Times, 28  March 13;  Cui Jia and  Cao  Yin,  ‘‘20 Sent to  Jail in  Xinjiang for  Terror Activities,’’  China Daily,  28   March 13.
34 Cui  Jia and   Cao  Yin,  ‘‘20 Sent to  Jail in  Xinjiang for  Terror Activities,’’  China Daily,   28 March 13; Zhang Yiwei,  ‘‘Terrorists Sentenced By Xinjiang Courts,’’  Global  Times, 28 March 13; Sui  Yunyan, ‘‘Five  Cases of  the   Use   of  the   Internet, Mobile   Phones, and   Electronic Storage Media To  Commit Crimes Tried in  Xinjiang’’  [5  qi  liyong  hulianwang, shouji ji  dianzi cunchu jiazhi jinxing fanzui anjian zai  jiang  shenpan], Tianshan Net,  26 March 13.
35 Chris Buckley, ‘‘China  Sentences 20 in Restive Region,’’ New  York  Times, 27 March 13. The New  York  Times quotes Human Rights Watch researcher  Nicholas Bequelin, who  states, ‘‘It’s not   clear what is being  alleged against these people  beyond being  members of a  clandestine  or- ganization.’’ He  continues, ‘‘China  has  for  a  long  time conflated religious activities taking place outside of state control with extremism. There’s [sic]  been  so many unsupported   accusations by the   Chinese government about extremist Islamic activities and   terrorist activities in  Xinjiang that it makes its  [sic] difficult to have faith in these kinds of announcements.’’ Uyghur American Association, ‘‘Uyghur  American Association Condemns Sentences Handed Down  to 20 Uyghurs,’’ 27  March 13;  ‘‘Uyghur  Jailings Highlight Chinese Media Controls,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  29  March 13;  ‘‘Again,  20  Uyghurs Are  Sentenced on  Charges of Using the   Internet and   Cell  Phones to Split the  State’’  [You  you  20  ming  weiwuer ren  beikong liyong  hulianwang, shouji deng   fenlie guojia  bei panxing], Uyghur Online, 27 March 13.
36 ‘‘Annual   Work   Report  of  Xinjiang’s  Courts’’   [Xinjiang  fayuan  gongzuo niandu    baogao], Xinjiang Court Net,  21  January 13; ‘‘Commentary: Severely Crack Down  on  Criminal Activities Using  the   Internet,  Cell   Phones,  and   Electronic  Storage  Media’’  [Pinglun:   yanli  daji   yong wangluo shouji ji dianzi chubei jiazhi fanzui de huodong], Xinjiang Daily,   reprinted in  Tianshan Net,  27 March 13; Wang  Yunxia, Xinjiang Production and  Construction Corps Bureau of Justice, ‘‘ ‘Secrets Act’ Study Session Organized and  Launched by the  45th Corps’  Legal  Outreach  Office Finishes Up’’ [Sishiwu tuan pufa  ban  zuzhi kaizhan de  ‘‘baomifa’’ xuexi  jieshu], 4 June 13.   ‘‘En- dangering state security’’  (ESS)  is a category of criminal offenses that authorities in  China have used to  punish peaceful activism, free  expression of ethnic identity, and  independent religious activity. CECC,  2009  Annual Report, 10  October 09,  244,  253–54. For  the  Chinese legal   defini- tion  of ESS,  see  PRC  Criminal Law  [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing  fa],  enacted 1 July 79, amended 14  March 97,  effective 1 October 97,  amended 25  December 99,  31  August 01,  29  De- cember 01,  28 December 02,  28 February 05,  29 June 06,  28 February 09,  25 February 11,  arts. 102–113.
37 Dui  Hua Foundation, ‘‘Transparency in  Xinjiang: Reporting on  State Security Trials,’’  Dui Hua Foundation Reference Materials, 7 March 13.
38 Ibid.
39 ‘‘Annual   Work   Report  of  Xinjiang’s  Courts’’   [Xinjiang  fayuan  gongzuo niandu    baogao], Xinjiang Court Net,  21 January 13; Dui  Hua Foundation, ‘‘Transparency in  Xinjiang: Reporting on  State  Security Trials,’’   Dui   Hua  Foundation  Reference Materials,  7  March   13;  ‘‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region   High   People’s  Court for  First Time  Publicly Issues Annual Work Report’’ [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu gaofa  shouci duiwai fabu  niandu baogao], Xinjiang Metropolis Daily,   19  January 12.  The  Xinjiang Metropolis Daily  article indicates 2012  was   the  first time authorities  publicly issued the  work  report on  Xinjiang’s courts.  In  2011,   courts in  the  XUAR tried and  completed 414  cases, an  increase of 38  cases  over  the   previous year. In  contrast, au- thorities completed 268  ESS  cases  in  the  region in  2008  and  437  cases  in  2009.  For  more  infor- mation on  ESS  cases  in  the  XUAR,  see,  e.g.,  CECC,  2012  Annual Report, 10  October 12,  150– 51.
40 ‘‘Tarim  University Students’ Case  Set  for First Court Hearing on May  25th’’ [Talimu daxue xuesheng an  dingyu benyue 25  ri  kaiting shenli], Uyghur Online, 15  May  13;  ‘‘Detained Tarim University Students Released On  Bail’’ [Talimu daxue zao  juliu xuesheng huo  baoshi], Uyghur Online, 29 May  13; ‘‘Detained Xinjiang Students  To Be Secretly Tried, WUC  Condemns Authori- ties   for  Detaining  People’’  [Xinjiang beibu  xuesheng  jiang   mimi   kaiting,  shiwei hui   qianze dangju zhuaren], Radio  Free Asia,  21 May  13.
41 ‘‘Tarim  University Students Released, Uyghur Students Continue to  be  Harassed by  PSB’’ [Talimu daxue huoshi weiwuer xuesheng chixu  zao  guobao  saorao], Uyghur Online, 19 June 13; ‘‘Detained Tarim University Students  Released On  Bail’’ [Talimu daxue zao  juliu xuesheng huo baoshi], Uyghur Online, 29 May  13.
42 ‘‘Expelled  Tarim University Student Is  Again  Illegally Detained’’ [Talimu daxue bei  kaichu xuesheng zai  zao  feifa  juliu], Uyghur Online, 24  June 13.  See  the  Commission’s Political Pris- oner  Database,  record 2013–00232 (Ablimit), record 2013–00233 (Dilshat), record 2013–00234 (Alimjan), record 2013–00235 (Ekber), and  record 2013–00236 (Abdureshit) for more  information on these cases.
43 Ibid.;  ‘‘Tarim  University Students Released, Uyghur Students Continue to  be  Harassed by PSB’’ [Talimu daxue huoshi weiwuer xuesheng chixu   zao  guobao   saorao], Uyghur  Online, 19 June 13. Article 56 of the  PRC  Criminal Procedure Law  mandates restrictions on the  movement of   individuals released  on  bail.   PRC   Criminal  Procedure Law   [Zhonghua renmin  gongheguo xingshi susong fa],  enacted 1 July 79,  amended 17  March 96,  14  March 12,  effective 1 January 13, art. 56.
44 ‘‘Expelled  Tarim University Student Is  Again  Illegally Detained’’ [Talimu daxue bei  kaichu xuesheng zai  zao feifa  juliu], Uyghur Online, 24 June 13.
45 Ibid.;  ‘‘Tarim  University Students Continue to be Detained Without Formal Procedures, and Are   Suffering Humiliation and  Beatings’’ [Talimu daxue xuesheng jixu  bei  wu  shouxu guanya bing  zao  ru da],  Uyghur Online, 27  May  13;  ‘‘Three  Uyghur University Students  Suspected of Overseas Links Released On  Bail  Pending Trial’’ [Sanming weizu  daxuesheng yi shewai baoshi houshen], Radio  Free Asia,  6 June 13.
46 Wang  Xia,  ‘‘Forty  Billion To  Be  Invested This  Year  in  Highway Construction in  Xinjiang, the   Construction of  Highways and   Major   Thoroughfares To  Be  Accelerated’’ [Xinjiang gonglu jianshe jinnian jihua touzi  400  yi  gonglu da  tongdao jiasu xingcheng], Yaxin  Net,  reprinted in Xinhua, 21 February 13.
47 He  Yan,  ‘‘Passengers at Xinjiang’s Kashgar Airport Exceed One  Million  Mark for  the  First Time’’ [Xinjiang kashi jichang luke  tuntu liang shouci tupo  100  wan  renci  daguan], Yaxin  Net, reprinted in Sina, 29 November 12.
48 Christina Larson, ‘‘On China’s Electricity  Grid,   East  Needs West—for Coal,’’  Bloomberg Businessweek, 21 March 13.
49 Mao  Weihua and   Yang  Wang, ‘‘Construction Corps Leads War  On  Poverty,’’  China  Daily, 9 November 12; ‘‘In 2013,  the  XPCC  Will  Invest 4.746  Billion To Promote 157  Agricultural Con- struction Projects’’  [Xinjiang bingtuan  2013  nian tou  47.46  yi  tuijin 157  ge  shenong xiangmu jianshe], Tianshan Net,  1 April  13.
50 ‘‘Shandong Province Starts An  ‘Educational Aid To Xinjiang’ Project, Strengthens Bilingual Teaching’’  [Shandong sheng qidong ‘‘jiaoyu  yuanjiang’’ gongcheng, jiaqiang  shuangyu  jiaoxue], Xinhua, reprinted in  Dazhong Net,  15  March 13;  ‘‘Counterpart Assistance Provinces and  Cities Invest  24   Billion  Yuan  in   Xinjiang  To  Implement  More   Than  2,300   Projects’’    [Yuanjiang shengshi touru xinjiang 240  yi yuan shishi 2300  duoge  xiangmu], Chinese News  Net,   reprinted in Xinmin Net,  15 November 12.
51 ‘‘Counterpart Assistance Provinces and  Cities Invest 24  Billion Yuan In  Xinjiang To Imple- ment More  Than 2,300  Projects’’  [Yuanjiang shengshi touru  xinjiang 240  yi  yuan shishi 2300 duoge  xiangmu], Chinese News   Net,   reprinted in  Xinmin Net,   15  November 12;  Su  Jianchao, ‘‘Xinjiang   ‘Spring   Wind   Action’  Provides  100,000 Employment  Positions  for  Rural   Workers’’ [Xinjiang ‘‘chunfeng  xingdong’’  wei  nongmin gong  tigong 10  wan  jiuye  gangwei], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinhua, 26 February 13.

52 Ma  Yining, ‘‘An Investment of Over  250  Billion Yuan in  Xinjiang in  2012  Has   Become  a Foregone Conclusion’’  [2012  nian xinjiang zhaoshang yinzi  chao  2500  yi yuan yi cheng dingju], Tianshan Net,  reprinted in  China Economic Net,  14  December 12;  ‘‘Foreign  Capital Flows  Into Xinjiang,’’  Xinhua, reprinted in  CRIEnglish, 21 December 12; Dong  Shaohua and  Wang  Yongfei, ‘‘In the  First Three Quarters, 136.7  Billion Was  Invested, Xinjiang People’s  Livelihood Construc- tion   Achieves Breakthrough   Progress’’   [Qian   san   ji  touru  zijin   1367   yi,  xinjiang  minsheng jianshe qude   tupoxing jinzhan], Tianshan  Net,   reprinted in  Xinjiang Daily,  4  November  12; Zhang Xiaocheng, ‘‘XPCC Invests More  Than 20  Billion Yuan To Speed Up  Poverty Alleviation in  Poor  Areas of Southern Xinjiang’’  [Xinjiang bingtuan touru 200  duo  yi yuan jiakuai nanjiang tekun diqu  tuopin], China Information Broadcast Network, reprinted in  People’s  Daily,  3 April
13; Zhu  Jingchao, ‘‘Representative Says  Kashgar, Xinjiang Will  Become  Economic Hub  for Central, Western, and   Southern Asia’’ [Daibiao cheng xinjiang kashi  jiang   cheng zhong   xi  nanya jingji  quan zhongxin], China News  Service, reprinted in Eastday, 7 March 13.
53 See,  e.g.,  ‘‘Accelerate  the  Course of Xinjiang’s Leapfrog Development  and   Long-Term Stability’’  [Jiakuai tuijin xinjiang kuayue shi  fazhan he  changzhi jiuan jincheng], Xinjiang Daily,
16  May  13;  Wang   Dan, ‘‘Xinjiang  Project To  Resettle Herders  Promotes Continuous Improvement  in   the   Living   Standards  of  Rural  Herders’’ [Xinjiang dingju  xingmu  gongcheng cujin
nongmumin shenghuo tiaojian chixu   gaishan], Tianshan Net,   reprinted in  China Religion and Ethnicity Net,   10  May  13;  Feng   Jin et  al.,  ‘‘Government Work  Report of the   Deliberations of the  Xinjiang Delegation Attending the  NPC  Meeting’’  [Chuxi quanguo renda yici  huiyi xinjiang daibiao tuan shenyi zhengfu gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, reprinted in  Xinjiang Daily,  6 March 13. The  Xinjiang Work  Forum was  convened in  Beijing in  May  2010  by top  central government and Party leaders. The  inaugural  forum set  government and   Party  objectives for  
the  XUAR’s  eco- nomic  and  political development, intensifying a  trend of top-down initiatives.  Work  Forum ini- tiatives  included the   expansion of  ‘‘counterpart  support’’   programs,
herder  resettlement  pro- grams, and   housing construction and   demolition projects in  areas inhabited by  Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. For  more  on the  Work  Forum, see  CECC,  2012  Annual Report, 10 Octo- ber  12, 149; CECC,  2011  Annual Report, 10 October 11, 196–97.
54 See,  e.g.,  PRC  Constitution, issued 4 December 82,  amended 12  April  88,  29  March 93,  15
March 99,  14  March 04,  arts. 4, 36.  China’s Constitution entitles minorities, like  all  
citizens of
China, to the  freedom of religious belief  and  freedom from  discrimination.
55 PRC  Regional Ethnic  Autonomy Law  [Zhonghua renmin  gongheguo minzu quyu   zizhifa], issued 31
May  84,  effective 1 October 84,  amended 28 February 01,  art. 9. The  Regional Ethnic Autonomy
Law  (REAL)  outlines ethnic minorities’ rights in  the  PRC,  including: self-government within
designated autonomous areas; proportional representation in  the  government; freedom to develop
their own  languages, religions, and  cultures; and  power  to  adjust central directives to local  
conditions. REAL  also  guarantees  minorities greater control over  local  economic develop- ment
than allowed in  non-autonomous areas; the  right to  manage and  protect local  natural re-
sources; and  the  right to organize local  public  security forces  to safeguard public  order.
56 ‘‘The Effects of Kashgar’s Special Zone,  Residents of Demolished Housing Cry  Foul’’ [Kashi
tequ xiaoying, fangwu beichai jumin shangfang hanyuan], Uyghur Online, 29  October 12;  Kilic Bugra
Kanat, ‘‘The Kashgar Incident and  China’s Uyghur Question,’’ World  Bulletin, 8 May  13;
‘‘Uyghur  Businessman Attacked After  Demolition Complaint,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  19 April  13.
57 Li   Yiren,  ‘‘Xinjiang   Spirit:  Leading  All  of  Xinjiang  in   Making  a   Big   Leap’’  
[Xinjiang jingshen: yinling quanjiang da  kuayue], Tianshan Net,  reprinted in  Tencent, 12  
November 12; Dai  Lan  and  Hu  Renba, ‘‘Strive  To Promote Leapfrog Development and  Long-Term
Stability— Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region  Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian’’ [Fenli tuijin
kuayueshi fazhan he  changzhi jiuan—xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu dangwei shuji  zhang chunxian],
People’s Daily,   11  September 12;  Xie  Sijia,   ‘‘Efforts  To  Promote Higher Standards  in  
Aiding   Xinjiang Work’’ [Yi  geng   gao  biaozhun quanli tuijin  yuanjiang gongzuo], Southern  
Daily,   reprinted in Nandu Net,   22  March 13;  ‘‘Audit  of Xinjiang Counterpart  Assistance
Projects Strives for  Full Coverage  of  Three  Southern  Xinjiang  Regions as   the   Focus   for  
2013’’  [Xinjiang yuanjiang xiangmu shenji  lizheng 2013   nian quan fugai   nanjiang san   dizhou
wei  zhongdian],  Xinjiang Daily,  reprinted in Xinhua, 29 March 13.
58 Li   Yiren,  ‘‘Xinjiang   Spirit:  Leading  All  of  Xinjiang  in   Making  a   Big   Leap’’  
[Xinjiang jingshen: yinling quanjiang da  kuayue], Tianshan Net,  12 November 12; Dai  Lan  and  Hu
‘‘Strive  To Promote Leapfrog Development and  Long-Term Stability—Xinjiang Uyghur Autono- mous   
Region   Party  Secretary  Zhang Chunxian’’ [Fenli tuijin  kuayueshi  fazhan  he  changzhi
jiuan—xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang chunxian], People’s  Daily,  11  September
12; ‘‘Audit of Xinjiang Counterpart  Assistance Projects Strives for Full  Coverage of Three South-
ern  Xinjiang Regions as  the  Focus  for  2013’’ [Xinjiang yuanjiang xiangmu shenji lizheng 2013
nian quan fugai   nanjiang san   dizhou wei  zhongdian], Xinjiang Daily,   reprinted in  Xinhua, 29
March 13.
59 ‘‘A New  Round of Aid to Xinjiang, 2,378  Aid Projects Have  Been  Implemented in Total’’ [Xin
yilun yuanzhu xinjiang leiji  shishi yuanzhu xiangmu 2378  ge],  Gucheng Net,  21  February  13.
60 ‘‘Circling   the   Wagons,’’  Economist,  25  May   13;  ‘‘Han  Migrant  Influx Threatens  
Uyghur Farms,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  11 March 13; ‘‘The Killing of a Uyghur Boy Triggers Uyghur-Han
Con- flict’’ [Yi weizu  nantong bei sha  yinfa  wei han chongtu], Radio  Free Asia,  10 April  13.
61 Gao  Lirong et  al.,  ‘‘Southern Xinjiang Passenger  Train Begins Operating,  the  First Group
of Rural Workers Enters Xinjiang for the  Southern ‘Gold Rush’ ’’  [Nanjiang linke kaixing shoupi
jin  xinjiang nongmin gong  nanxia ‘‘taojin’’], Xinjiang Metropolis Daily,  reprinted in  Xinhua,
February 13;  Xue  Genzhu,  ‘‘Qianjiang: A Thousand Rural Residents Travel Far to  Xinjiang to
‘Pan  for  Gold’ ’’  [Qianjiang: qianming nongmin gong  yuan fu  xinjiang ‘‘taojin’’], Xinhua, 8
13;  He  Zhanjun and   Zhang Yongheng, ‘‘Xinjiang  Railway Line  Opens To  Deal  With   Surge of
Workers  Coming Into   Xinjiang’’  [Xinjiang tielu  kaixing linke  yingdui jinjiang wugong keliu],
Xinhua, 20 February 13; Pang Shuwei, ‘‘Qinghai:  60,000 Rural Residents Go to Xinjiang To Pick
Cotton’’ [Qinghai: 6 wan  nongmin fu xinjiang cai  mian], Xinhua, 12 October 12.  For  more  infor-
mation on  the  demographics of southern areas of the  XUAR,  see  ‘‘Full Text:  Development and


Progress in  Xinjiang,’’  Xinhua, 21  September 09;  Stanley Toops,  ‘‘Demographics and   Develop-
ment in Xinjiang After  1949,’’ East-West Center, 1 May  04.
62 ‘‘Han Migrant Influx Threatens Uyghur Farms,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  11 March 13.
63 ‘‘Uyghur  Family Home  Bulldozed,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  11 October 12.
64 ‘‘Han Migrant Influx Threatens Uyghur Farms,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  11 March 13.
65 The  PRC  government established the  XPCC  in  1954  as  a means of settling  demobilized sol-
diers and  Han migrants to  perform border defense functions and  to  support  economic develop-
ment. The  government’s White Paper on the  History and  Development of Xinjiang says  that the
ranks of  the   XPCC  are   now  ‘‘a mosaic of  people   from   37  ethnic  groups, including the   
Han, Uygur, Kazak, Hui,   and   Mongolian.’’   It describes the   XPCC  as  ‘‘a special social  
organization, which  handles its  own  administrative and  judicial affairs’’  but  ‘‘in accordance
with the  laws  and regulations of the  state and  the  Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.’’ State
Council Information Office, ‘‘History  and  Development of Xinjiang,’’  May  2003,  Part 9.
66 ‘‘Circling the  Wagons,’’ Economist, 25 May  13.
67 ‘‘Xinjiang  Peaceful Resident, Prosperous Citizen Projects Have   Doubled  Completion  Rate’’
[Xinjiang anju  fumin gongcheng kaigong jungong shuang  chao’e],  Tianshan Net,   reprinted in
Xinhua, 17  December 12;  ‘‘Xinjiang  XPCC  Annual Rural Peaceful Resident Housing Work  Rate
Exceeds  90   Percent’’    [Xinjiang bingtuan   niandu   nongcun  anju  zhufang  kaigong  lu   chao
jiucheng],  Chinese  News   Net,   reprinted  in   Fujian  China  Gold   Online  Net,   23  October
‘‘Xinjiang   Peaceful  Resident,  Prosperous  Citizen  Projects  Increase  by   320,000  
Households’’ [Xinjiang anju fumin gongcheng xin  zeng  32  wan  hu],  Xinjiang Daily,  reprinted in
 Xinhua, 13
December 12.
68 ‘‘Shanghai Aids  in  the   Construction of  Kashgar’s  ‘Peaceful Resident,  Prosperous  Citizen’
Projects, With  Special Funds Reaching 820  Million’’ [Shanghai yuanjian kashi ‘‘anju fumin’’
gongcheng zhuanxiang  zijin  da  8.2  yi],  China Net,  10  May  13;  Hong  Liu,  ‘‘Shanghai City  
Aids in   the   Construction  of  Peaceful  Resident,  Prosperous  Citizen  Projects,  Benefitting  
Households of Rural  Herders’’ [Shanghai  shi  yuanjian anju fumin gongcheng huiji 11  wan  hu
nongmumin], Kashgar Government Information Net,  11  April  13;  ‘‘Xinjiang  Peaceful Resident,
Prosperous Citizen Projects Increase by  320,000 Households’’ [Xinjiang anju  fumin gongcheng xin  
zeng  32 wan  hu],  Xinjiang Daily,  reprinted in Xinhua, 13 December 12.
69 ‘‘Herdsman on  New  Road  to  a  Happy Life,’’ China Daily,  reprinted in  CRIEnglish, 20  No-
vember 12; ‘‘Xinjiang  Herdsmen Move House,’’ China Daily,  17 October 12; Claire O’Neill,  ‘‘What
Big Highways Mean For  China’s Small Villages,’’ National Public Radio,  18 October 12.
70 See  generally Human Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘No One  Has  the  Liberty To Refuse’:  Tibetan Herders
Forcibly Relocated in  Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and  the  Tibet  Autonomous Region,’’ June 2007;
Human  Rights in  China, ‘‘China:  Minority Exclusion, Marginalization  and   Rising  Tensions,’’
2007,  14; China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law:  Does  It Protect Minority Rights? Staff  Round-
table of  the   Congressional-Executive  Commission on  China, 11  April   05,  Testimony of  
Chris- topher P.  Atwood,  Associate Professor, Department  of Central Eurasian  Studies, Indiana
Uni- versity. For  Commission analysis, see  ‘‘State  Council Opinion Bolsters Grazing Ban,  Herder
Re- settlement,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 18 October 11.
71 Kang Yan,  ‘‘In Three Years, Xinjiang Has  Completed the  Resettlement of 136,800 Herders’’
[Xinjiang 3 nian lai  wancheng youmumin dingju 13.68  wan  hu],  Yaxin  Net,  reprinted in  China
Xinjiang, 6 May  13; Wang  Dan, ‘‘Xinjiang  Project To Resettle Herders Promotes Continuous Im-
provement in  the  Living  Standards of Rural Herders’’ [Xinjiang dingju xingmu gongcheng cujin
nongmumin shenghuo tiaojian chixu   gaishan], Tianshan Net,   reprinted in  China Religion and
Ethnicity Net,  10 May  13.
72 ‘‘[Xinjiang  Forum] Kashgar  Old  City’s  Old  Appearance Gets   a  New  Look’’ [[Xinjiang tai]
kashi laocheng de jiumao yu xinyan], China Radio  International, 11 December 12.
73 A 2008  book  by  architect and   historian George   Michell described Kashgar  before  the  Old
City  demolition as  ‘‘the  best-preserved example of  a  traditional  Islamic city  to  be  found  
 any- where in  Central Asia.’’ Michael Wines, ‘‘To Protect an  Ancient City,  China Moves  To Raze
 It,’’ New  York  Times, 27 May  09.
74 ‘‘The Effects of Kashgar’s Special Zone,  Residents of Demolished Housing Cry  Foul’’ [Kashi
tequ xiaoying, fangwu bei  chai  jumin shangfang hanyuan], Uyghur Online, 29  October 11.  For the  
population figure of 220,000, see  ‘‘Ancient  Xinjiang City’s  Residences Safer After  Gov’t Re-
building Program,’’ Global  Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 26 May  10.
75 For  general background on  the  project, see  ‘‘Demolition  of Kashgar’s Old  City  Draws Con-
cerns Over  Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,’’ CECC  China Human Rights and  
Rule  of Law  Update, No. 3, 2009,  2. For  more  information on concerns regarding the  reset-
tlement of Old  City  residents and  the  project’s impact on Uyghur cultural heritage, see  Uyghur
Human Rights Project, ‘‘Living On the  Margins: The  Chinese State’s Demolition of Uyghur Com-
munities,’’ 2 April  12.
76 See,  e.g.,  Michael Wines, ‘‘To Protect an  Ancient City,  China Moves  To Raze  It,’’ New  
Times, 27 May  09; ‘‘China Remodels Silk  Road  City  but  Scars Run  Deep,’’ Agence  
7 August 11 (Open  Source Center, 7 August 11); Uyghur Human Rights Project, ‘‘Living On  the
Margins: The  Chinese State’s Demolition of Uyghur  Communities,’’ 2  April  12,  16–17, 55,  71–
77; Joshua  Hammer,  ‘‘Demolishing Kashgar’s History,’’  Smithsonian Magazine, March 2010.
77 Michael Wines, ‘‘To Protect an  Ancient City,  China Moves  To  Raze  It,’’ New  York  Times,
27  May  09; Hu  Xiaorong, ‘‘Kashgar, Xinjiang Spends Three Billion Yuan To Transform the  Old City
 District, Plans To Backfill 35.9  Kilometers of Tunnels’’  [Xinjiang kashi 30  yi  yuan gaizao
laochengqu jiang  huitian 35.9  gongli  didao], Yaxin  Net,  23 March 09.
78 Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Center, ‘‘Please  Help  To Protect Kashgar Old  Town,’’
16 April  09; International  Council on Monuments and  Sites, ‘‘ICOMOS World  Report 2008–2010 on  
Monuments and   Sites in  Danger,’’  2010,  48–51. Details  of the   Old  City  demolition project
suggest that  authorities have bypassed ways   to  protect Old  City  residents’ safety while   
pre- serving existing buildings. Standards set  by professionals in the  field  of cultural
heritage preser- vation indicate compatibility between historic preservation and  measures to  
guard against nat-


ural  disaster. Articles 10  and   14  of  the   Charter for  the   Conservation of  Historic Towns
  and Urban Areas, adopted by the  non-governmental International  Council on  Monuments and  Sites
(ICOMOS) and  available on its  Web site,  recognize the  importance of introducing ‘‘contemporary
elements’’ and  preventative measures against natural disasters while  ensuring they are  ‘‘adapt-
ed to the  specific  character of the  properties concerned.’’  Charter for the  Conservation of
Historic Towns   and   Urban Areas, adopted by  ICOMOS General  Assembly, October 1987,  arts. 10,  
79 See,  e.g.,  PRC  Constitution, issued 4 December 82,  amended 12  April  88,  29  March 93,  15
March  99,   14   March  04,   art.  4;  PRC   Regional  Ethnic  Autonomy  Law   [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo minzu quyu  zizhifa], issued 31 May  84,  effective 1 October 84,  amended 28 February
01,  art. 9; PRC  Labor Law  [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa],  issued 5 July 94,  effective
1  January 95,  amended 10  October 01,  art. 12;  PRC  Employment Promotion Law  [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo jiuye  cujinfa], issued 30  August 07,  effective 1 January 08,  art. 28.  See  also
legal   analysis in  ‘‘Governments  in  Xinjiang Continue  To  Sponsor, Sanction  Job   Recruitment
That  Discriminates  Against Ethnic  Minorities,’’ CECC  China Human Rights and   Rule  of Law
Update, No.  2,  2009;  ‘‘Xinjiang  Kashgar Prefecture Career Units (Agency  Worker and   Service
Positions) Position Table   of 2013  Recruitment of Workers’’  [Xinjiang kashi  diqu   shiye   
danwei (jiguan gongqin gangwei) 2013  zhaopin gongzuo renyuan  gangwei biao],  Civil  Service
Examina- tion  Information Network, 28  March 13;  ‘‘Xinjiang  Changji People’s   Hospital 2012  
Public  Re- cruitment for  Workers’’  [Xinjiang changjizhou renmin  yiyuan 2012  nian shiye   
danwei gongkai zhaopin  gongzuo renyuan],  China  Talent  Net,   last  visited 2  July  13;  
‘‘[Xinjiang]   Xinjiang, Kashgar Prefecture, Shache County Education System 2013  Recruitment’’
[[Xinjiang] Xinjiang kashi diqu   shache xian   jiaoyu   xitong 2013  zhaopin], Chongqing Normal
University,  reprinted in Graduate Job  Net,  19 May  13. For  more  information regarding job
discrimination against eth- nic  minorities  in  Xinjiang,  see   ‘‘Job  Discrimination Against
Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,’’  Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March
80 See,   e.g.,  Luntai Industrial Park, ‘‘Bazhou  Dongchen Group  Ltd.   Co.  Recruiting   
Notice’’ [Bazhou dongchen jituan  youxian gongsi   zhaopin jianzhang], 9  June 13;  Hainan  
‘‘Xinjiang  Water  Resources and   Hydropower Research Institute  2013  Personnel  Recruitment’’
[Xinjiang shuili shuidian kexue yanjiuyuan 2013  nian rencai zhaopin], 7 June 13; Zhang Xinyu,
‘‘Xinjiang  Convenes Summer Recruitment  Meeting for  Vocational School  Graduates’’ [Xinjiang
juban xiaji  dazhongzhuan biyesheng zhaopin hui],   Xinjiang Daily,   reprinted in  Tianshan Net,
19 May  13; Hutubi Human Resources and  Social  Security Bureau, ‘‘Hutubi  County 2013  ‘Private
Enterprise Recruitment Week’  Recruitment  Information’’ [Hutubi xian  2013  nian ‘‘minying  qiye
zhaopin zhou’’  zhaopin xinxi],   reprinted in  Hutubi  County Government, 6  June 13.  See  also
‘‘Uyghur   Women    Face   Double    Discrimination   When  Applying  for   Civil   Service   
Positions’’ [Weiwuer nuxing bao  kao  gongwuyuan mianlin shuangzhong qishi], Uyghur Online, 17 May  
81 David  Scott, ‘‘Lack of Better Jobs  for China’s Ethnic Minorities a Worsening Problem,’’  Mel-
bourne Newsroom, 22  November 12;  Sunanda  Creagh, ‘‘Inequality Fuels Tension Between Chi- na’s
Minority Uyghurs and  Hans,’’ Conversation, 26 November 12.
82 ‘‘Xinjiang  People’s  Congress Representatives  Discuss How  To Make  the  Road  Smoother for
Those   Going  Inland To  Do  Business and   Work’’ [Xinjiang renda  daibiao taolun  ruhe  rang fu
neidi  jingshang wugong zhi  lu geng  tongchang], Tianshan Net,  29 January 13.
83 ‘‘In 2011,  Xinjiang Achieved the  Transfer and   Employment of 2.58  Million   Rural Surplus
Laborers’’   [2011  nian  xinjiang shixian nongcun fuyu   laodongli zhuanyi  jiuye   258  wan   
renci], Xinjiang Daily,  reprinted in Central People’s  Government, 22 March 12.
84 CECC,   2008  Annual Report, 31  October 08,  179;  CECC,   2009  Annual Report, 10  October
09, 264–66; CECC,  2010  Annual Report, 10 October 10, 211–12.
85 ‘‘Farmers Pressed Into   Road  Work,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  19  December 12;  ‘‘Uyghurs   Pressed
Into  Field Work,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  8 February 13.
86 For  background information on  how  authorities in  the  XUAR  have targeted religious and
political publications in  censorship campaigns, see  ‘‘Xinjiang  Authorities Target Religious and
Political  Publications  in   Censorship   Campaigns,’’  Congressional-Executive   Commission  on
China, 31 March 11.
87 ‘‘Transportation Department  Increases Supervision of  ‘Sweeping  Away   Pornography’ in Road  
Transportation Links’’ [Jiaotong yunshuting  jiada daolu yunshu huanjie ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ jianguan
lidu],   XUAR  Transportation Department, 7  March 13.  For  information on  a  similar campaign,
see  ‘‘Tekes County Public Security Bureau Launches Activity Focused on  Destroying Illegal
Religious Publications’’ [Tekesi xian  gonganju kaizhan jizhong xiaohui feifa  zongjiao chubanwu
huodong], Tekes County Television Station, reprinted  in  Tekes County Government,
2 November 12.
88 ‘‘Sentencing Document: Phoenix News   Is  Innocent, Uyghur Who  Helped Them Is  Guilty’’
[Panjueshu:  fenghuang xinwen wuzui, bang qi  weiwuer ren   youzui], Uyghur  Online, 15  Feb- ruary
13;  ‘‘Exclusive:  A Uyghur Who  Served as  Translator for  Chinese Media Was  Sentenced to  11  
Years, the   Media Did  Not  Dare To  Report This   For   Several Years’’  [Dujia  baodao: yi
weiwuer  ren   wei   zhongguo meiti  dang  fanyi   beipan  11  nian,  meiti  changda jinian  bu   
gan baodao], Uyghur  Online, 13  February 13;  Mai  Yanting, ‘‘Uyghur  Who  Translated for  Phoenix
Satellite TV Sentenced to 11 Years, Media Silence Is  Criticized’’  [Weizu  ren  ti fenghuang
weishi fanyi  bei  panxing 11 nian, meiti jinsheng zao  piping], Radio  France Internationale, 16
13.  See  the  Commission’s Political Prisoner  Database,  record 2013–00089, for  more  
information on the  case.
89 Mai  Yanting, ‘‘Uyghur   Who  Translated for  Phoenix Satellite  TV  Sentenced to  11  Years,
Media Silence Is  Criticized’’   [Weizu  ren  ti fenghuang weishi fanyi   bei  panxing 11  nian,
meiti jinsheng zao  piping], Radio  France Internationale, 16  February 13;  ‘‘Uyghur  Youth  Who  
Acted as  a  Translator for  Phoenix Satellite  TV  Sentenced to  11  Years’’  [Wei  fenghuang  
weishi zuo fanyi, weiwuer qingnian beipan shiyi  nian], Radio  Free Asia,  13 February 13.
90 Article 13(7)  of the  PRC  Passport Law  and  Article 8(5)  of the  PRC  Exit  and  Entry
Control Law  give  officials   the  discretion to  prevent Chinese citizens from  traveling abroad
when they believe that a citizen’s leaving China might harm ‘‘state  security’’  or harm or cause
‘‘major loss’’


to national interests. The  meaning and  scope  of harm or loss  to state security or national
inter- ests are   undefined,  however, which   has   led  to  official  abuse and   arbitrary  
enforcement. PRC Passport Law  [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa],  issued 29  April  06,  
effective 1 January
07;  PRC  Exit  and   Entry Control Law  [Zhonghua renmin  gongheguo chujing rujing guanli fa],
issued 30 June 12, effective 1 July 13.
91 ‘‘Uyghur  Scholar, Daughter Held,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  1 February 13.
92 ‘‘Scholar  Put on 24-Hour Watch,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  7 February 13; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit:
China Uses  Passports as  Political Cudgel,’’ New  York  Times, 25 February 13.
93 ‘‘Minzu University Student  Atikem Continues To Be  Harassed by  Xinjiang State  Security’’
[Zhongyang minzu daxue xuesheng atikemu chixu  bei  xinjiang guobao  saorao], Uyghur Online,
7 February 13.  For  Commission analysis on the  cases  of Ilham Tohti and  Atikem Rozi,  see  
‘‘Au- thorities Block  Uyghur Scholar From Leaving China, Refuse To Grant Passport to Uyghur Stu-
dent,’’  Congressional-Executive  Commission on  China, 7  March 13.  See  also  Uyghur Human
Rights Project, ‘‘Briefing:  Refusals of Passports to  Uyghurs and  Confiscations of Passports Held
by Uyghurs Indicator of Second-Class Status in China,’’ 7 February 13.
94 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘No Exit:  China Uses  Passports as  Political Cudgel,’’  New  York  Times, 22
February 13; Atikem Rozi, ‘‘Correspondence: [My] Passport Is Not  Processed, Xinjiang Police  Say
I’m Politically Unqualified’’ [Laixin: huzhao bu  gei  ban, xinjiang jingfang shuo  wo zhengzhi bu
hege],  Uyghur Online, 16 December 12.
95 ‘‘Xinjiang  Uyghur Student  Detained by  Police  at the  Beijing Airport [Has   Been  Gone]  for
More  Than a  Week’’ [Xinjiang weizu   xuesheng zai  beijing jichang bei  jing  daizou yu  yi  
zhou], Radio  Free Asia,  23 July 13.
96 Atikem Rozi  (Web  name Uyghuray), ‘‘Mutellip,  Where Are  You? ’’   [Mutalipu, ni  zai  nali?],
Uyghur Online, 22 July 13; ‘‘A Uyghur Student Studying Abroad Is  Detained Prior to Boarding Time  
at Beijing Airport, World  Uyghur Congress Condemns Authorities for  Persecuting  Those Who  Return
to  the   Country’’   [Yi  weizu   liuxuesheng  beijing dengji qian  yi  bei  kou  shiweihui qianze
 dangju  yan   cha   guiguozhe],  Radio   Free  Asia,   23  July  13;  Atikem  Rozi  (Web  name
Uyghuray), ‘‘Urgent  Appeal: Release Mutellip, Resolutely Oppose Forced Disappearances’’ [Jinji
huyu: shifang mutalipu, jianjue fandui qiangpo shizong], Uyghur Online, 7 August 13.
97 Human  Rights  Watch,  ‘‘Malaysia:    Stop    Forced  Returns   to   China,’’   3   February   
13; Hemananthani Sivanandam and  Dorothy Cheng, ‘‘Six Uighurs Deported for Violating Immigra- tion  
Laws,’’ Sun  Daily,  18 February 13.
98 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Malaysia:  Stop  Forced Returns to China,’’ 3 February 13.
99 Ibid.;  World  Uyghur Congress, ‘‘WUC Condemns Illegal Deportation of Uyghurs From Ma- laysia,’’
4 February 13.
100 ‘‘Deported  Uyghurs Jailed,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  20  December 12.  The  mother of one  of the
sentenced men  reportedly told  RFA  that authorities did  not  allow  her  to  attend the  trial
of her son,  but  she  believed authorities  accused him  of separatism based on  his  translation
assistance to  other Uyghurs in  Malaysia. It is  unclear whether or  not  the  11  Uyghurs were  
charged with or sentenced on charges of terrorism in China.
101 For  information on various legal  restrictions on Islamic practices in  the  XUAR,  see  CECC,
2012  Annual Report, 10 October 12, 151–52.
102 ‘‘Exclusive  News:   Xinjiang Religious Control of  ‘Special  Groups’—Documentation of  Reg-
istration’’ [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang zongjiao guanzhi ‘‘teshu  renqun’’—dengji zai  an],  Uyghur
On- line,  1 May  13. For  more  information on restrictions on Uyghurs’ religious practices, see  
Uyghur Human Rights Project, ‘‘Sacred  Right Defiled:   China’s Iron-Fisted  Repression of Uyghur  
Reli- gious  Freedom,’’  30 April  13.
103 Uyghur Human Rights Project, ‘‘Sacred  Right Defiled:   China’s Iron-Fisted  Repression of
Uyghur Religious Freedom,’’  30 April  13, 2.
104 Ibid.,  17, 30, 36–43, 66, 83.
105 ‘‘Eid Eve  Clashes Stoked by  Gunshots Fired at Uyghur Girl,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  12  August
13;  Uyghur American Association, ‘‘UAA Condemns Shootings by  Police  During Religious Cele-
bration,’’  14 August 13.
106 ‘‘Confrontation With  Police  Occurs in  Aksu,  At  Least 3 People Are  Shot  and  Killed  by
Po- lice’’ [Akesu fasheng jingmin duizhi, zhishao 3 ren  bei  jingcha kaiqiang dasi], Radio  Free
9  August 13;  ‘‘In Another Bloody  Conflict in  Xinjiang, 3  Are  Dead  and  More  Than 20  Are  
In- jured’’ [Xinjiang zai  you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo  shang], Radio  Free Asia,  12 August 13.
107 ‘‘In Another Bloody  Conflict  in  Xinjiang,  3  Are  Dead   and   More   Than 20  Are  
Injured’’ [Xinjiang zai  you  liuxue chongtu 3  si  20  duo  shang], Radio   Free Asia,  12  August
13;  ‘‘Three Uyghurs Shot  Dead, 20 Injured in  Eid  Eve  Clashes,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  10 August
13; ‘‘Hundreds of Uyghurs Held  After  Violence  Over  Prayer Restrictions,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  15
August 13.
108 ‘‘In Another Bloody  Conflict  in  Xinjiang,  3  Are  Dead   and   More   Than 20  Are  
Injured’’ [Xinjiang zai  you liuxue chongtu 3 si 20 duo  shang], Radio  Free Asia,  12 August 13;
‘‘Confronta- tion   With   Police   Occurs in  Aksu,   At  Least 3  People Are  Shot   and   Killed
  by  Police’’  [Akesu fasheng jingmin duizhi, zhishao 3 ren  bei  jingcha kaiqiang dasi], Radio  
Free Asia,  9 August 13.
109 ‘‘In Another Bloody  Conflict  in  Xinjiang,  3  Are  Dead   and   More   Than 20  Are  
Injured’’ [Xinjiang zai  you  liuxue chongtu 3  si  20  duo  shang], Radio   Free Asia,  12  August
13;  ‘‘Three Uyghurs Shot  Dead, 20 Injured in Eid  Eve  Clashes,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  10 August
110 Anne  Henochowicz, China Digital Times, ‘‘Ministry  of Truth: Violence  in  Xinjiang on  Eid,’’
11 August 13.
111 ‘‘Xinjiang  Raids Point to  Religious Controls,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  7  March 13;  Hai  Lan,
‘‘In Xinjiang, Another Instance  of  Searches Leads to  a  Clash Between Uyghurs and   Police,   
With Two  Dead’’ [Xinjiang you  yin  qingcha zhi  weiren yu  jing  chongtu 2 si],  22  May  13.  
For  specific examples of security checks, police  raids, and  house searches, see  Fu  Yongkai,
‘‘Wolituogelake Township Thoroughly Carries  Out   ‘Three   Inspections’  Unified  Action’’  
[Wolituogelake xiang shenru kaizhan ‘‘sancha’’ tongyi xingdong], Xinjiang Peace Net,  6 May  13;
‘‘Kashgar’s  Strict In- spections, 7 Uyghurs Detained’’ [Kashi yancha 7 weiren bei jing  daizou],
Radio  Free Asia,  7 May
13;  ‘‘Inspection  in   Awat   County  Leads  to  Two  Dead—Authorities  Conceal Details  of  


[Xinjiang awati xian  qingcha zhi  er  ren  siwang dangju yinman anqing], Uyghur Online, 23 May
13; Meng  Hongqi, ‘‘Qiongkule  Township Focuses on Carrying Out  ‘Two Sessions’ Security Inspec-
tion   Operation’’ [Qiongkule  xiang  jizhong  kaizhan   ‘‘lianghui’’  anbao  da   qingcha  
xingdong], Qiongkule Township Government, reprinted  in  Qiemo  County Government, 6 March 13;  
Xiang Xuan,  ‘‘Halayugong Township  Carries  Out   Major   Stability  Maintenance  Inspections’’
[Halayugong xiang kaizhan weiwen da  qingcha], Xinjiang Peace Net,  13 June 13; Damian Grammaticas,
‘‘Doubts  Over  China Government Claims on  Xinjiang Attack,’’  BBC,  26  April  13; Edward Wong,  
‘‘21 Dead   in  Clash With   ‘Gangsters’ in  Western China,’’  New  York  Times, 24
April  13;  Uyghur American Association, ‘‘Unlawful  House Search and  Arbitrary Use  of Lethal
Force   Results [in]  Nearly Two  Dozen  Deaths in  Kashgar,’’ 24  April  13;  Peter  Ford,
‘‘Mystery Clouds Deadly Clash in  Western China With  ‘Suspected Terrorists,’ ’’  Christian  
Science Monitor,
24 April  13.
112 ‘‘Exclusive  News:   Xinjiang Religious Control of  ‘Special  Groups’—Documentation of  Reg-
istration’’ [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang zongjiao guanzhi ‘‘teshu  renqun’’—dengji zai  an],  Uyghur
On- line,  1 May  13; ‘‘China Registering the  Religious in Xinjiang,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  2 May  
113 ‘‘Exclusive  News:   Xinjiang Religious Control of  ‘Special  Groups’—Documentation of  Reg-
istration’’ [Dujia baoliao: xinjiang zongjiao guanzhi ‘‘teshu  renqun’’—dengji zai  an],  Uyghur
On- line,  1 May  13.
114 ‘‘China Registering the  Religious in Xinjiang,’’  Radio  Free Asia,  2 May  13.
115 ‘‘Xinjiang  Will  Enter the  Religious Belief  Status of Ethnic Minority Families Into  
Stability Maintenance Roster’’  [Xinjiang jiang   shaoshu minzu jiating zongjiao xinyang qingkuang
lieru weiwen mingce], Radio  Free Asia,  2 May  13.
116 ‘‘Fourth  Round of Training Launched for  Our  Region’s  Patriotic Religious Figures’’  [Woqu
aiguo  zongjiao renshi  disi  lun  peixun qidong], Xinjiang Daily,   28  March 13;  ‘‘Fourth  Round
of XPCC  Religious Figures’ Political and   Legal   System Education Training Begins Second   Term
of Classes’’  [Bingtuan disi  lun  bingtuan zongjiao renshi zhengzhi fazhi  jiaoyu  peixun dier  qi
kai ban], XPCC  United Front Work  Department, 9  April  13;  ‘‘Qiba’erxiang 2013  Annual Patriotic
Religious Figure Training Class’’  [Qiba’erxiang 2013  niandu aiguo  zongjiao renshi peixun ban],
Kaba County Government,  24  April   13;  ‘‘Sa Township, Kaba  County,  Holds   Patriotic Figure
Training Class’’ [Kabahe xian  sa  xiang juban aiguo  renshi peixun ban], Altay  Women’s  Federa-
tion,  25 April  13.
117 Li Xing,  ‘‘Fourth  Round of Training Launched for Our  Region’s  Patriotic Religious Figures’’
[Woqu  aiguo  zongjiao renshi disi  lun  peixun qidong], Xinjiang Daily,  28 March 13.
118 For  statements illustrating the  ‘‘frequent and  widespread’’ nature  of the  campaigns, see  
Li Donghui, ‘‘Intensively Study  and   Implement the   Spirit of the   18th Party  Congress, Strive
To Create New  Conditions Care for the  Next  Generation Work  Committee’’ [Shenru  xuexi  guanche
dang de  shibada jingshen, nuli  kaichuang  guangongwei gongzuo xin  jumian], Xinjiang Care for the
 Next  Generation Work  Committee, 19  February 13;  Circular Regarding the  Launch of the
2013  Regional Vocational Student Summer Social  Practicum [Guanyu kaizhan 2013  nian zizhiqu
dazhongzhuan xuesheng shuqi  shehui  shijian  de  tongzhi], China  Communist  Youth   League
Xinjiang Committee, 27  June 13;  China Communist Youth  League Xinjiang Committee, ‘‘Reso- lutely  
Resist  Illegal Religion, Firmly  Establish  an   Ideological Foundation  for  Young   People’’
[Jianjue dizhi  feifa  zongjiao, dianding he  laogu  qingshaonian de  sixiang jichu],  18  January  
13. For  representative  anecdotal examples of campaigns, see  Xinjiang Association for  Science
and Technology, ‘‘Tekes  County Launches School  Activities To  Resist Extremist  Religious Thought
and   Preaching’’  [Tekesi  xian   kaizhan  dizhi   zongjiao jiduan  sixiang  xuanjiang  jin   
xuexiao huodong], 27 March 13; Xinjiang Care for the  Next  Generation Work  Committee, ‘‘Yanqi
County Launches County–Wide Religious Propaganda Educational Activities in County, City,  and  
Town- ship  Schools  To Stop  Illegal Religious Activities’’  [Yanqi  xian  zai  quan xian  cheng
xiang xuexiao kaizhan zhizhi feifa  zongjiao xuanchuan jiaoyu  huodong], 5 April  13; Aksu  
Prefecture Education Bureau, ‘‘Prefectural Education System Takes Numerous Measures and  Carries
Out  Solid  Prop- aganda Educational Work  To Curb Illegal Religious Activities’’  [Diqu  jiaoyu  
xitong duocuo  bing ju  zhashi kaizhan zhizhi feifa  zongjiao huodong xuanchuan  jiaoyu   gongzuo],
12  September  12; Kong  Xiaofeng, Bole  City  Retired Cadre Bureau, ‘‘In 2012,  Propaganda
Lectures Carried Out by the  Bole City  Care for the  Next  Generation Work  Committee To Curb
Illegal Religious Activi- ties   Achieved Remarkable   Results’’   [Bole   shi   guangongwei  2012  
 nian  kaizhan  zhizhi  feifa zongjiao huodong xuanjiang chengxiao xianzhu], reprinted  in  Bole  
City  Party Construction, 25
December 12.
119 Zhu  Kaili,  ‘‘Kashgar Prefecture Female Bu¨ wi Successfully Complete Patriotic Thankfulness
Education’’ [Kashi  diqu  nu  buwei   yuanman  wancheng aiguo   gan’en   jiaoyu], Tianshan  Net,   
December 12; Ma  Dengchao, ‘‘Xinjiang,  Kargilik County, Yitimukong Township Convenes Town-
ship-Wide Bu¨ wi  Training’’ [Xinjiang  yecheng  xian   yitimukong xiang zuzhi quan  xiang buwei
jinxing peixun], China Ethnicity and  Religion Net,  28 February 13.
120 For  information on earlier steps to increase regulation of bu¨ wi and  place  them under state
control, see  ‘‘Xinjiang  Authorities Tighten Controls Over  Muslim Women,’’ CECC  China Human
Rights and  Rule  of Law  Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; ‘‘Xinjiang  Authorities Train, Seek  To
Regu- late Muslim Women  Religious Figures,’’  CECC  China Human Rights and  Rule  of Law  Update,
No. 4, 2009,  2.
121 Zhu  Kaili,  ‘‘Kashgar Prefecture Female Bu¨ wi Successfully Complete Patriotic Thankfulness
Education’’ [Kashi  diqu  nu  buwei   yuanman  wancheng aiguo   gan’en   jiaoyu], Tianshan  Net,   
December 12.
122 ‘‘Uyghur  Youth  Detained for Selling Touch  Reading Pen  for the  Quran Has  Been  Released’’
[Chushou ‘‘gulanjing’’ diandubi er  zao  ju  weiwuer qingnian huoshi], Uyghur Online, 15 May  13;
‘‘Young Uyghur Detained for  Selling Quran  Touch   Reading Pens’’  [Weiwuer zu  qingnian  yin shou
  ‘‘gulanjing’’  diandubi bei  juliu], Uyghur Online, 23  April  13;  ‘‘Official Says   21  Dead   
2 Injured in  Kashgar Terrorist Attack’’  [Guanfang cheng kashi kongbu xiji 21 si 2 shang], Radio
Free Asia,  24 April  13.
123 Ibid.


124 The  2001  Amendments to the  1994  XUAR Regulation on the  Management of Religious Af- fairs
mandate prior government approval for the  sale  and  distribution of religious material. The
Amendments are  unpublished but  documented by  Human Rights Watch and  Human Rights in China in  
their report ‘‘Devastating Blows:  Religious Repression of Uighurs in  Xinjiang,’’  1 April
05.  For  the  1994  Regulation, see  ‘‘Xinjiang  Uyghur Autonomous Region  Regulation on the  Man-
agement of Religious Affairs’’ [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], passed 16
July 94, effective 1 October 94.
125 For   representative  examples, see   the   Commission’s Political  Prisoner  Database  record
2009–00328 (Kurbanjan  Semet),  record 2009–00314 (Merdan  Seyitakhun),  and   record  2008–
00014  (Alimjan Yimit).
126 ‘‘Jailed  Uyghur Pastor Denied Visit,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  23 January 13.
127 See  CECC,  2012  Annual Report, 10 October 12, 152.
128 Zhang Guijun, Bole City  Ethnic and  Religious Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Bole City  Adopts a Number of
Measures To  Prohibit Minors From Entering  Places of Worship’’  [Bole  shi  caiqu duo  xiang
cuoshi zhizhi weichengnian ren  jinru zongjiao huodong changsuo], reprinted  in  Bole  City  Gov-
ernment,  25  July  13;  Liu   Zhenxiang,  Do¨ rbiljin  (Emin)  County  Government,  ‘‘Emin  County
Adopts a  Number of Measures To Safeguard the  Ramadan Period’’  [Emin xian  caiqu duo  xiang
cuoshi quebao zhaiyue qijian], 5 July 13; CPC  Hoboksar Mongol  Autonomous County Committee and  
Organization Department, ‘‘Hoboksar  County Tiebukanwusan  Township’s Three Measures To Strictly
Prohibit Minors From Entering Places of Worship’’  [Hebukesaier xian  tiebukenwusan xiang san  
xiang cuoshi yanli zhizhi weichengnian ren  jinru zongjiao huodong changsuo], 29 July
129 ‘‘Uyghur   Muslims  Face   New   Religious  Clampdown,’’ Radio   Free Asia,   11  July 13;  
Bill Smith, ‘‘China’s Controls Curb Uighurs’ Ramadaan,’’ South African Press Association, reprinted
in  IOL  News, 12  July 13; Liu  Haijun, Korgas (Huocheng) County Committee Office,  ‘‘Huocheng
County Committee Office  Cadres Take  the  Lead  in  Not  Believing in  Religion and  Not  
Fasting’’ [Huocheng xian  weibian ban  ganbu daitou bu  xinjiao bu  fengzhai], reprinted in  Korgas
Govern- ment, 12  July 13;  Wen  Fucheng, ‘‘Health   Road   Community  Organizes  Activity for  All
 Party Members To  Sign  Pledge To  Deal  With   Illegal  Religious Activities According to  the   
Law  and Curb Extremist  Thinking’’ [Jiankang lu  shequ zuzhi quanti dangyuan ganbu qianding yifa  
zhili feifa  zongjiao huodong, ezhi  zongjiao jiduan sixiang chengnuo shu], Akqi  (Aheqi)  County
Govern- ment, 16 July 13.
130 ‘‘A  Uyghur With   a  Strong  Religious Consciousness Was  Expelled From His  Public  Post’’
[Yi zongjiao yishi   nonghou de  weiwuer ren  bei  kaichu gongzhi], Uyghur Online, 3  August  13;
‘‘Uyghur  Fired for  Fasting’’ [Yi weiwuer ren  yin  fengzhai er  bei  tingzhi  gongzuo], Uyghur  
On- line,  29 July 13.
131 ‘‘Uyghur  Muslims Face  New  Religious Clampdown,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  11  July 13;  Uyghur
American Association, ‘‘UAA Condemns Shootings by  Police  During  Religious Celebration,’’ 14
August 13;  ‘‘Eid Eve  Clashes Stoked by  Gunshots Fired at Uyghur Girl,’’ Radio  Free Asia,  12
August 13;  ‘‘One Dead  and  Two  Injured in  a  Uyghur–Han  Conflict in  Xinjiang, Authorities  on
Alert for  Eid   Holiday’’  [Xinjiang  wei  han  chongtu yi  si  liang shang  rouzijie dangju
tisheng jiebei],  Radio  Free Asia,  5 August 13.
132 Graham Adams, ‘‘The Xinjiang Perspective: Part III,’’ Diplomat, 8 November 12.
133 For  Commission analysis, see  ‘‘Xinjiang  Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin–Fo-
cused  Bilingual Education,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May  11.
134 Ibid.
135 ‘‘Uyghur  Youths Forced Into   Exile   in  Order To  Protect  Their Ethnic  Identity’’ [Weiwuer
nianqing ren  wei  baohu minzu shenfen er  bei  po  liuwang haiwai], Radio  Free Asia,  translated
and  reprinted in  Uyghur Online, 1 June 13;  ‘‘Uyghurs  Support Language Protest,’’ Radio  Free
Asia,  27 October 10.
136 Zhang Xuehong, ‘‘Xinjiang  Has  Nearly 1.41  Million  Students in  Bilingual Education Class-
es,  Teaching Personnel  Are  the   Bottleneck’’ [Xinjiang shuangyu  ban   xuesheng yi  you  jin  
141 wan  ren, shizi  shi  pingjing], Yaxin  Net,  reprinted in  People’s  Daily,  24 December 12.  
At the  end of 2012,  there were  reportedly 1.68  million students  in  the  XUAR  enrolled either
in  ‘‘bilingual education’’ or  as  minkaohan students  (minkaohan students  are   enrolled in  
longstanding  pro- grams, which   are  separate from  ‘‘bilingual   education,’’ that  place   
ethnic minority students  di- rectly into   Mandarin  Chinese schooling). This   figure reportedly
represents  a  19.2  percent in- crease over  2011,  and  comprised 66.6  percent of the  ethnic
minority student population enrolled at the  preschool to  the  secondary school  level.  See  
Cheng Yong,  ‘‘Xinjiang:  A Belief  That ‘Bilin- gual  Education’ Will Change One’s  Fate, Parents
Are  Willing To Select Bilingual Kindergartens’’ [Xinjiang: xiangxin  ‘‘shuangyu’’  gai   mingyun,
fumu yuan  xuan  shuangyu  youeryuan], China
News  Service, reprinted in Sohu, 6 March 13.
137 Zhang Xuehong, ‘‘Xinjiang  Has  Nearly 1.41  Million  Students in  Bilingual Education Class-
es,  Teaching Personnel  Are  the   Bottleneck’’ [Xinjiang shuangyu  ban   xuesheng yi  you  jin  
141 wan  ren, shizi  shi  pingjing], Yaxin  Net,  reprinted in People’s  Daily,  24 December 12.
138 See  Cheng Yong,  ‘‘Xinjiang:  A Belief  that  ‘Bilingual Education’ Will  Change One’s  Fate,
Parents Are   Willing  To  Select  Bilingual  Kindergartens’’  [Xinjiang: xiangxin  ‘‘shuangyu’’   
gai mingyun, fumu yuan  xuan  shuangyu  youeryuan], China News   Service, reprinted  in  Sohu,  6
March 13.
139 Ren  Xixian, ‘‘Xinjiang’s Yili Ethnic Minority Family Planning Households Happily Receive
‘Fewer  Births, Faster  Wealth’ Monetary Rewards’’  [Xinjiang yili  shaoshu minzu jisheng hu  xi
ling  ‘‘shaosheng kuaifu’’  jiangli jin],  Xinhua, reprinted in  People’s  Daily,  20  September
12;  Liu Chunyang,  ‘‘Sixty-Five   Minority  Households  in   Tuokayi  Township  Happily  Receive   
Yuan in  Fewer Births, Faster  Wealth Rewards’’   [Tuokayi xiang  65  hu  shaoshu  minzu xiling
shaosheng kuaifu jiangli jin  40  wan   yuan], China News   Service, 15  March 13.  Under Article
15 of the  XUAR’s Regulation on Population and  Family Planning, rural ethnic minority families are
 permitted to  give  birth to  a  maximum of three children, and  urban ethnic minority couples are
 permitted to  give  birth to  two  children. When one  member of the  couple  is  an  urban resi-
dent, urban birth limits apply. For  information on reward programs in  earlier years, see  CECC,
2012  Annual Report, 10 October 12, 153.
140 Ren  Xixian, ‘‘Xinjiang’s Yili Ethnic Minority Family Planning Households Happily Receive
‘Fewer  Births, Faster  Wealth’ Monetary Rewards’’  [Xinjiang yili  shaoshu minzu jisheng hu  xi
ling  ‘‘shaosheng kuaifu’’  jiangli jin],  Xinhua, reprinted in  People’s  Daily,  20  September
12;  Liu Chunyang,  ‘‘Sixty-Five   Minority  Households  in   Tuokayi  Township  Happily  Receive   
Yuan in  Fewer Births, Faster  Wealth Rewards’’   [Tuokayi xiang  65  hu  shaoshu  minzu xiling
shaosheng kuaifu jiangli jin 40 wan  yuan], China News  Service, 15 March 13.
141 For  more  information on  these types of reward mechanisms, see  CECC,  2012  Annual  Re-
port, 10 October 12, 153.
142 ‘‘Training Course for Northern Xinjiang Rural Resident Reproductive Health Religious Fig- ures
and  Managers’’ [Beijiang nongmumin shengzhi jiankang  zongjiao renshi he  guanli renyuan peixun
ban], XUAR  Population and   Family Planning Commission, reprinted  in  Tianshan Net,
14  December 12;  ‘‘Deputy  Mayor   Ma  Zhongyong Visits Mosque That  Is  the   Site   of a  Muslim
Reproductive Health Preaching Education Project’’  [Ma  zhongyong fu  shizhang weiwen musilin
shengzhi jiankang xuanchuan jiaoyu   xiangmu dian qingzhensi], Wuzhong City  Population and Family
Planning Bureau, 31 August 12. The  project is also  referred to as  the  ‘‘Herder  Reproduc- tive  
Health Project’’ (nongmumin shengzhi jiankang xiangmu). See  ‘‘Key Work  of the  Prefectural Family
Planning Commission for 2013’’ [2013  nian diqu  jihua shengyu xiehui gongzuo yaodian], Altai  
Prefecture Population and  Family Planning Commission, 22  March 13;  ‘‘Autonomous Re- gion  
Convenes Northern Xinjiang Herder Reproductive Health Project Religious Figures and Managers’  
Training   Course’’   [Zizhiqu juban  beijiang  pian  nongmumin  shengzhi  jiankang xiangmu
zongjiao renshi he guanli renyuan peixun ban], XUAR Population and  Family Planning Commission,
reprinted in XUAR Leading Group on the  Rule  of Law,  17 December 12.
143 Jiang Yan,  ‘‘Muslim  Reproductive Health Project Extends Benefits to Nearly 300,000 Mus- lim  
Masses in  Yining County’’  [Musilin shengzhi jiankang xiangmu huiji yining xian  jin  30 wan
musilin qunzhong], Tianshan  Net,   29  September 11;  XUAR  Population and   Family Planning
Commission, ‘‘Association  Information—August 22’’ [Xiehui xinxi],  22 August 11.
144 ‘‘Autonomous Region  Convenes Northern Xinjiang Herder Reproductive Health Project Re- ligious  
Figures  and   Managers’  Training  Course’’   [Zizhiqu juban  beijiang  pian  nongmumin shengzhi
jiankang xiangmu zongjiao renshi  he  guanli renyuan  peixun ban], XUAR  Population and  Family
Planning Commission, reprinted  in  XUAR  Leading Group on  the  Rule  of Law,  17
December 12; ‘‘Key Work  of the  Chinese Family Planning Association for 2013’’ [Zhongguo jihua
shengyu xiehui 2013  nian gongzuo yaodian], Guangyuan City  Family Planning  Association, 14
December 12; ‘‘Deputy  Mayor  Ma  Zhongyong Visits Mosque That Is  the  Site  of a Muslim Repro-
ductive  Health  Preaching  Education  Project’’   [Ma   zhongyong  fu   shizhang  weiwen musilin
shengzhi jiankang xuanchuan jiaoyu   xiangmu dian qingzhensi], Wuzhong City  Population and Family
Planning Bureau, 31 August 12.
shengzhi jiankang xuanchuan jiaoyu   xi Family Planning Bureau, 31 August 12.